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  GENDER POLITICS AND CHILD CUSTODY:  
 
THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF THE BEST INTEREST STANDARD  
 
Elizabeth S. Scott* & Robert E. Emery** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The best interest of the child standard has been the prevailing legal rule for resolving 
child custody disputes between parents for nearly forty years. Almost from the beginning, it has 
been the target of academic criticism.1 As Robert Mnookin famously argued in his 1975 article, 
“best interests” are vastly indeterminate2 – more a statement of an aspiration than a legal rule to 
guide custody decisionmaking.3 The vagueness and indeterminacy of the standard make 
outcomes uncertain and give judges broad discretion to consider almost any factor thought to be 
relevant to the custody decision. This encourages litigation in which parents are motivated to 
produce hurtful evidence of each other’s deficiencies that may have a lasting, deleterious impact 
on their ability to act cooperatively in the interests of their children.    
 Despite these deficiencies, the best interest standard has proved to be remarkably durable. 
Although scholars as well as the American Law Institute have proposed reforms,4 legislative 
                                                 
*Harold R. Medina Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. 
**Professor of Psychology; Director, Center for the Study of Children and the Law, University of Virginia. . For 
helpful comments, we thank Kate Bartlett, Buss, Peg Brinig, Maxine Eichner, Bert Huang, Clare Huntington,  Lois 
Weithorn and especially Robert Scott. For excellent research assistance, we thank Rena Stearn and annie Steinberg.   
1For critiques of the best interest standard and discussion, see Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: 
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (SUMMER 1975); Rena Uviller, 
Fathers’ Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 107 (1978); David 
Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984); Jon 
Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987).  
2
 See generally Mnookin, Id. 
3Lon Fuller observed that a judge deciding custody under the best interest principle is “not applying law or legal 
rules at all, but is exercising administrative discretion....” Lon Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. 
JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1969). 
4AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §208 (2002)(hereinafter 
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efforts to narrow the best interest standard have been largely unsuccessful. A few states have 
adopted a rule that bases custody on parents’ caretaking, but at least one legislature rejected a 
court-imposed primary caretaking rule, reviving the best interest standard.5  Repeated efforts by 
fathers’ groups to enact laws favoring joint custody have usually failed as well.6 The persistence 
of best interests presents a puzzle: Are the academic critics wrong or does something other than 
the utility of the rule explain the reluctance of policymakers to change the status quo?   
 This Essay confirms the deficiencies of the best interest standard and seeks to explain its 
persistence despite its obvious limitations. First we argue that the standard’s entrenchment is the 
product of a gender war that has played out in legislatures and courts across the country for 
decades. Most substantive reforms have been perceived (usually accurately) as favoring either 
fathers or mothers, and thus have generated political battles between their respective advocates.  
The primary front in this war has been a protracted battle over joint custody.  Fathers’ groups 
have lobbied hard for statutes favoring joint physical custody, but they have been opposed 
vigorously by women’s advocates.7 As a result of the standoff, little progress has been made (in 
any direction) toward replacing the best interest standard with a custody decision rule that would 
narrow and guide the judicial inquiry. 
 Mothers’ and fathers’ supporters have also battled over the formulation of the best 
interest standard itself, with each group arguing for presumptions that can trump other factors 
when the standard is applied. Mothers’ advocates, allied with law enforcement groups, have 
lobbied effectively for a statutory presumption disfavoring the parent who has engaged in acts of 
                                                                                                                                                             
PRINCIPLES). The ALI custody standard is based on the approximation standard proposed by one of us. Elizabeth  
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992)(hereinafter Pluralism). 
5MINN. STAT. ANN. §518.17 (WEST SUPP. 2009). The primary caretaker preference was adopted by the state 
Supreme Court. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W. 2d 705 (Minn. 1985)(establishing primary caretaker preference).   
6See discussion. t.a.n. _ to _ infra.  
7
 Id. 
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domestic violence.8 Fathers’ groups have responded by seeking to persuade courts and 
legislatures to assign substantial negative weight to one parent’s concerted efforts to alienate the 
child from the other parent.9 Each of these factors implicates a key policy concern and, in theory, 
might bring greater determinacy to custody doctrine in important categories of cases. But 
domestic violence and (particularly) alienation claims are difficult to verify, and courts are often 
ill equipped to separate valid from weak claims.10 This uncertainty encourages contesting parents 
to raise marginal claims, which, if successful, can trump other factors relevant to the best interest 
determination.11 In turn, excessive use of domestic violence and parental alienation claims 
threatens to diminish the credibility of genuine claimants.12  
 The gender-based motivations of advocates battling over doctrinal reform are 
understandable, but the apparent satisfaction of legal actors with the best interest standard is 
more puzzling. Judges and legislators are familiar with the application of the standard in practice 
and might be expected to be concerned about its indeterminacy.13 We argue that the legal 
system’s confidence in the best interest standard rests on a misplaced faith in the ability of 
psychologists and other mental health professionals (MHPs) to evaluate families and advise 
courts about custodial arrangements that will promote children’s interests.14 But this confidence 
in MHPs is not justified. Clinical testimony in custody proceedings often fails to meet even 
minimal standards of scientific validity and MHPs have no special expertise in obtaining reliable 
                                                 
8
 Many custody statutes include a rebuttable presumption disfavoring the parent who has engaged in domestic 
violence. See note _  infra. 
9
 See t.a.n. _ to _ infra.  
10
 See t.a.n.__ to_ infra.   
11
 See t.a.n._ to_ infra (discussing defensive and offensive use of these claims).  
12See t.a.n. _ to _ infra. 
13See t.a.n.  _ infra.  
14
 See Part IV infra.  Mental health experts in custody disputes include psychologists, psychiatrists, clinical social 
workers and other clinicians.  
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family information in the context of divorce. Moreover, psychological knowledge currently does 
not provide the expertise to perform the complex function of evaluating and comparing 
noncommensurable factors.15 Mental health experts are no better than are judges at these tasks; 
their participation simply masks and perpetuates the failure of the best interest standard to 
provide legal guidance.   
 This account is rather pessimistic, but there is reason to believe that the political economy 
deadlock can be broken if lawmakers understand that MHPs can not cure the deficiencies of the 
best interest standard.  We argue for the adoption of the American Law Institute approximation 
standard allocating custody between parents on the basis of past caretaking. This rule offers a 
relatively verifiable proxy for best interests that narrows judicial discretion and obviates the need 
for psychological evidence; it also may be increasingly attractive as fathers’ parenting 
contributions expand.16 Moreover, even under existing law, evidentiary and procedural reforms 
can mitigate the problems of the best interest standard.  Psychological testimony can be subject 
to the screening that applies to scientific evidence in other legal proceedings.17  Also mediation 
and other reforms can facilitate custody planning by parents themselves.  Parents have better 
information about family functioning than third party decisionmakers and, in most cases, are 
more likely than judges to make workable plans for their post-divorce families.18 
  The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part II describes the deficiencies of the best interest 
standard, focusing on the daunting verifiability challenges judges face in applying the standard. 
                                                 
15
 Id. See generally Robert Emery, Randy Otto & William Donahue, A Critical Assessment of Child Custody 
Evaluations, 6 PSYCH. SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (2005) (hereinafter Critical Assessment); Timothy 
Tippins & Jeffrey Wittman, Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody Recommendations, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 193 
(2005).   
16
 See note 4 supra and discussion in Part V infra.    
17See t.a.n. _ to_ infra. 
18Jana Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family: Implications of a Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 
363 (2009)(describing trend toward private ordering, including mediation, and expressing concern).   
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Parts III and IV explore the political economy explanation for the persistence of the best interest 
standard. Part III examines the gender war in legislatures, particularly the repeated battles over 
joint custody in recent decades. Part IV turns to the struggles to elevate the importance of 
domestic violence and parental alienation respectively as key factors in applying the standard. 
Part V focuses on the illusion of mental health expertise as the second key to the entrenchment of 
the best interest standard. We challenge the assumption that MHPs enable courts to escape the 
indeterminacy of best interests or guide them toward good custody decisions. Part VI proposes 
substantive and procedural reforms that can improve custody decisionmaking, potentially 
resulting in arrangements that conform more closely to the law’s policy goal.   
 
II .WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE BEST INTEREST STANDARD?  
A. Critiquing and Justifying the Standard 
Much of the academic critique of the best interest standard is familiar and need not be 
rehearsed in detail.19 Like indeterminate standards generally, the best interest test generates high 
enforcement costs, inviting litigation and imposing substantial burdens on courts and parties.20  
In addition, custody adjudication imposes onerous psychological costs that are exacerbated under 
the best interest standard. Because of its indeterminacy and the salience of qualitative 
considerations,21 the standard encourages parents to produce evidence of each other’s failings, 
intensifying hostility between them and undermining their inclination to cooperate in the future 
                                                 
19
 See note 1 supra 
20
 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557 AT 560-562 (1992). 
 Indeterminate standards encourage parties to produce a broad range of evidence in an effort to produce proxies that 
courts will favor. See also Robert Scott and George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE 
L. J. 814 (2006).   
21
 Under the best interest standard the quality of parenting and of each parent’s relationship with the child are key 
factors. See Minnesota statute, infra note 24.   
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in matters concerning their child.22  
 Sometimes the substantial costs of applying an indeterminate standard are justified when 
the circumstances relevant to decisions are so complex and varied across cases that courts, with 
the advantage of hindsight, are in a better position to determine the relevant criteria to be applied 
in individual cases than are legislatures ex ante.23 The typical custody statute embodies this 
rationale, directing courts to consider a wide range of proxies for best interest, implicitly 
assuming that the mix of relevant factors and the weight accorded to each will vary across 
families.24 Certainly, supporters articulate this defense of the best interest standard, arguing that, 
because of the complexity of family circumstances, courts must have broad discretion to consider 
any factor that might be relevant to a particular child’s best interest.25  On this view, a more 
determinate rule that would restrict parties’ freedom to introduce wide-ranging evidence for 
judicial consideration is likely to result in bad decisions.  The argument for the standard assumes 
that courts are competent to select and weigh the relevant criteria for best interest in individual 
cases and to evaluate the evidence offered by each party that favors his or her claim. 
B. The Problem of Verifiability 
 This assumption is false:  Courts are not well positioned to select and weigh best interest 
                                                 
22See Scott, Pluralism, supra note 4 at 622.  Jon Elster emphasizes the high costs to the child of custody litigation. 
Supra note 1 at 24. See also Elizabeth Scott & Robert Emery, Custody Dispute Resolution: The Adversarial System 
and Divorce Mediation, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND 
EXPERTISE, L. WEITHORN (ED.(1987)(describing costs).  
23
 Under these conditions, the costs of defining the precise content of regulation through rules that anticipate the 
many contingencies that might arise may be higher than the (high) enforcement costs of applying a vague standard.  
See Kaplow, supra note 20 at 560-562;  Scott and Triantis, id., at 842-43 (2006) (emphasizing  the benefit of 
hindsight enjoyed by courts).   
24See MINN. STAT. ANN  §518.17 (prohibiting courts from focusing exclusively on one factor as abuse of discretion). 
Courts have found trial courts’ overemphasis on any single factor to be an abuse of discretion. See e.g. Bartosz v. 
Jones, 2008 WL 4595267.  
25Opponents of a joint custody presumption or approximation standard argue that courts cannot be restricted from 
considering factors that may be important in individual cases. See infra note _ supra (describing this argument 
against joint custody).  One court cited approximation approvingly, but criticized it for restricting courts from 
considering factors other than past caretaking.  In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W. 2d 683 (2006) at 697. 
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proxies or evaluate the wide-ranging evidence offered by parties. This is so, in part, because 
much of the evidence deemed relevant to the judicial inquiry – including the criteria considered 
to be legitimate best interest proxies– often cannot be verified; that is, it cannot be proven by 
contesting parents to a third party decisionmaker.26 To be sure, family circumstances are varied 
and complex, and an omniscient judge might be capable of accurately assessing evidence and 
selecting appropriate criteria in each case for weighing the competing claims. But real world 
judges face what frequently are insurmountable obstacles as they seek to perform their role 
faithfully.  
 Three impediments severely handicap the ability of courts to evaluate the evidence 
offered by disputing parents. First, the privacy of family life makes assessing the accuracy of 
information in a custody proceeding very difficult.  Second, the best interest standard 
exacerbates this problem by encouraging parties to introduce qualitative evidence about 
parenting and family relationships. And third, the factors considered to be good legal proxies for 
best interest are intrinsically incommensurable and judges simply are not capable of reliably 
calculating their weight relative to one another.27 
1. Family privacy and verifiability 
The ability of a third party to verify information about behavior and relationships within a 
family is limited under the best of circumstances, because much of family life is private and 
many interactions are not verifiable to outsiders even when they are observable to family 
                                                 
26
 Contracts scholars have probed the problem of verifiability which arises when courts seek to interpret and 
evaluate compliance with vague contract terms. The challenge is particularly difficult in settings where the quality of 
performance is hard to evaluate, and information available to the parties is not readily accessible to third party 
decisionmakers. See discussion in  Scott & Triantis, supra note 20; Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and 
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988);  Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of 
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Studies 271 (1992). 
27CHECK Mnookin’s observation that courts applying the best interest standard ultimately rest decisions on value 
judgments alludes to the incommensurability problem. Supra note 1. 
 8 
members. For example, one parent may know from direct observation that the other has paid 
little attention to the child, but, unless the disinterest is extreme, it is difficult to convey this 
information persuasively to a judge. Beyond this, the parents’ perceptions about interactions and 
relationships may differ radically.28  Distortions are likely to be particularly acute in the context 
of a contested divorce proceeding, when each parent is highly motivated to describe family 
relationships and behavior in a way that favors his or her claims.29  
2. The challenge of qualitative proxies 
These challenges may undermine courts’ ability to acquire accurate information about 
family functioning under any rule or standard, but the verifiability problem is exacerbated under 
the best interest standard. Because the standard implicitly focuses the inquiry on which party will 
be a better parent, it invites parties to introduce qualitative evidence that is difficult to assess 
accurately.  Custody statutes emphasize, for example, the closeness of the bond between parent 
and child, the parents’ stability and competence to care for the child, and the openness of each 
parent to the other’s relationship with the child. These factors may well be relevant to the child’s 
welfare, but they rest on complex emotional and psychological considerations that are often 
impervious to proof.30 Also, information obtained in the midst of a bitter divorce provides a poor 
basis for assessing family behavior and relationships before the crisis or for predicting the future, 
because both parents and children often experience high levels of stress.31  Thus a third party (a 
                                                 
28For a discussion of husbands’ and wives’ conflicting perspectives on marriage, parenting and divorce, see ROBERT 
E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, 3-14 (1994). 
29
 Sometimes children can provide information, but younger children may not be reliable reporters and giving minor 
children of any age a central role in providing evidence risks placing them in the middle of the dispute between their 
parents. See Robert E. Emery, Children’s Voices: Listening– and Deciding– is an Adult Responsibility, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 621 (2003)(arguing against involving children in custody disputes).  
30
 Thus the parties may know which parent has the closer bond with the child but proving that fact to a court in a 
bitterly contested custody case is often impossible. 
31
 ROBERT EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS,  8 (1994). 
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judge or MHP32) may draw erroneous inferences about parent-child relationships, or about a 
parent’s character, mental health and childrearing competency on the basis of behavior that is 
context-specific.   
3. The Incommensurability Problem 
Finally, courts deciding custody face an often insurmountable challenge because key best 
interest factors are inherently incommensurable and legislatures typically provide little guidance 
in resolving this problem. The general assumption (consistent with the choice of a standard 
rather than a rule) is that different best interest proxies will vary in importance depending on the 
circumstances of the case,33 and as a consequence statutes do not guide courts by rank-ordering 
factors.  Thus, the court must assign weight to the various factors the parties’ evidence is 
intended to establish.  But what is the right scale to use in balancing one parent’s claim that she 
has a closer bond with the child against the others insistence that he is more emotionally stable? 
To decide this question, the court must evaluate each factor on the basis of a) its relative 
importance to the child’s best interest (in general and in the case) and b) a judgment about the 
credibility and sufficiency of each party’s evidence supporting a finding that the factor has been 
established.  Courts often will be unable to perform these tasks satisfactorily. Not only is this 
calculus prone to error because each of these best interest factors is difficult to verify, but the 
weight assigned to competing factors ultimately will often rest on a subjective value judgment.  
It is clear that courts face what are often insurmountable challenges in applying the best 
interest of the child standard.  To be sure, family circumstances are complex and varied but, in 
this context, there is little reason to believe that the broad discretion the standard gives to judges 
results in better custody decisions. But if courts lack the ability to perform the tasks required to 
                                                 
32
 See discussion t.a.n. _ to _ infra.  
33
 See note _ supra.  
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determine the best interest of individual children, why has the best interest standard endured for 
forty years?  Although scholars have been virtually unanimous in criticizing the current legal 
regime, courts and legislators appear unmoved.   
 
III. LEGISLATIVE BATTLES OVER CUSTODY 
 Two alternative custody rules have been advanced that would substantially reduce the 
verifiability challenges facing courts in deciding custody cases,34 but neither has been embraced 
by legislatures or courts.  The first, a presumption favoring shared physical parenting, has been 
vigorously, but largely unsuccessfully, promoted by fathers’ groups for more than a generation.35 
Mothers’ advocates have favored a rule that narrows the best interest inquiry by focusing on past 
parental caregiving, but they have not actively promoted this rule in the political arena and it has 
gained little traction among lawmakers.36  
 In this Part, we argue that the durability of the best interest standard (and the failure of 
lawmakers to adopt either of these alternative rules) can be explained in part as the result of a 
political economy deadlock that has persisted for decades. The intense battles between interest 
groups supporting mothers and fathers have focused on many custody-related issues,37 but the 
ongoing struggle over joint custody has been the most sustained and pervasive campaign in this 
gender war. We examine this struggle, along with other forces that have contributed to the rather 
                                                 
34
 FN re Fam law casebooks 
35
 See t.a.n. _ infra 
36
 See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E. 2d357 (W.Va 1981)(establishing primary caretaker preference and listing relevant 
factors ). More recently, scholars and law reform groups have proposed an approximation rule that allocates future 
custodial time between the parents on the basis of past caregiving roles. See note 4 supra and Part V infra. See also 
W.VA. CODE ANN.  §48-9-206 (MICHIE 2001)(adopting approximation standard).  
37
 Fathers’ organizations have lobbied for parental alienation provisions, restrictions on relocation by custodial 
parents and reductions in child support, while mother advocates have opposed these efforts and promoted domestic 
violence laws and restrictions on admissibility of parental alienation. See . http://acfc.convio.net/site (describing 
lobbying activities of American Coalition of Fathers and Children). See also note _ infra.  
 11 
passive support for a primary caretaker preference among women’s advocates.38  The political 
standoff over joint custody and the absence of the primary caretaker preference from legislative 
agendas have left the best interest standard entrenched as the custody decision rule.     
A. The Fathers’ Movement and the Battle over Joint Custody 
 Fathers’ advocates have actively sought to reform child custody law since the 1970s.39 
The political movement, which today includes a network of national and local organizations40 
arose out of dissatisfaction with the legal treatment of divorced fathers who, supporters believed, 
seldom won custody under the ostensibly gender-neutral best interest standard. Advocates 
protested that restrictions on non-custodial fathers’ access to their children following divorce 
diminished the parent-child relationship. At the same time, fathers were required to assume a 
substantial burden of child support- a source of resentment for many fathers.41 
 The sustained effort to enact state laws favoring joint legal and physical custody has been 
at the heart of fathers’ legislative agenda from the beginning.42 In part, the goal was pragmatic; 
fathers were unlikely to succeed in lobbying for a custody rule that favored fathers over mothers.  
But shared custody promised fathers equality with mothers in the allocation of custodial time and 
parental authority. It also could reduce the burden of child support as fathers assumed a larger 
                                                 
38
 Women’s advocates have lobbied vigorously for legislative domestic violence presumptions. See discussion t.a.n. 
_ to _ infra.    
39
 James Cook, an early father’s rights advocate, led a successful 1980 campaign to enact legislation favorable to 
joint custody in California. See James Cook, Activist, was the Father of Joint Custody, L.A. TIMES, March 12, 2009.  
40Men’s groups actively promoting joint custody reform include American Coalition for Fathers and Children 
(www.acfc.com); Fathers and Families (www.fathersandfamilies.org); Equal Rights for Divorced Fathers 
(equalrightsfordivorcedfathers.com); and the National Coalition for Men (www.ncfm.org).   
41See MEL ROMAN & WILLIAM HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT (1978)(describing  fathers’ disgruntlement over 
traditional custody arrangements and advocating for joint custody). See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, 
Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OH ST. L. J. 455 (1984)(describing fathers’ anger at diminished role).  
42The mission statement of the American Coalition for Fathers and Children (ACFC), supra note 37, a large fathers’ 
rights organization, states in large letters “ACFC’s mission is shared parenting.” First among its goals is “equal, 
shared parenting time or joint custody.” http://acfc.convio.net/site/PageServer?pagename=MissionStatement.  
 12 
share of child care responsibility.43  
 In legislatures across the country, men’s groups have promoted joint custody legislation, 
returning year after year in some states to lobby for favorable legislation. The efforts have been 
intensive—including testimony, letter writing and email campaigns, media ad campaigns, 
blogging, and the placement of news stories, editorials and op-eds.44  Many men’s organizations 
have active web sites that cover political activities relating to joint custody.45 The typical bill 
promoted by these organizations includes a presumption favoring equally shared physical 
custody, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence that this arrangement is not in the best 
interest of the child.46 
 Joint custody campaigns have encountered stiff opposition in most states from coalitions 
of opponents including, most prominently, advocates for mothers. Two types of women’s 
organizations have been particularly active– groups that advocate generally for women’s rights 
(particularly the National Organization for Women (NOW)), and groups that focus on domestic 
violence and child abuse. NOW has taken a strong stand against a statutory presumption favoring 
joint custody and has lobbied hard (and successfully) in a number of states including California, 
                                                 
43Many states have a different payment schedule for families in which the child resides for substantial periods with 
both parents. See VA CODE  ANN. §20-108.1 (MICHIE 2008)(lower rates for obligor spending 110 days per year with 
child). 
44See discussion of 2005 California initiative, t.a.n. _ to _ infra . See also notes 38 & 41 supra.  
45See note 38 and 41 supra (web sites seeking to mobilize support for joint custody laws). ACFC publishes an 
online newsletter, “The Liberator,” designated “America’s Shared Parenting Quarterly.” Acfc.convio.net. Glenn 
Sacks, director of Fathers and Families and a high profile advocate for joint custody, writes a blog and appears on 
cable TV frequently. See   http://www.Glennsacks.com/blog/index.php,National.  
46Such bills have been introduced in many states including West Virginia, Iowa, New York, California, 
Massachusetts and Michigan.  See W. VA. SB 438 (2009), discussed in Alison Knezevich, Sweeping Child-Custody 
Changes Proposed, 3\16\09, wvgazette.com;  N.Y. A03181 (2009) (requiring court to order joint custody unless 
contrary to child’s interest).   Michigan fathers’ groups have repeatedly lobbied for a shared physical custody bill. 
See eg .H.B. 4564 (2007), described at dadsformichigan.org/shared parenting.  After In re Hanson, 733 N.W.2d 683 
(Iowa 2007) held that the Iowa custody statute did not create a presumption favoring joint physical custody, a group 
called Iowa Fathers lobbied for a bill clarifying that the statute creates such a presumption. See S.F. 507, found at 
www.iowafathers.com/legislative/sf507. 
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Michigan, and New York.47  Domestic violence organizations have rallied to persuade legislators 
that shared custody represents a serious threat to victims.48  These advocates often have been 
joined by organizations of judges and attorneys, who urge the need to retain judicial discretion 
 under the best interest standard.49 
 In California, the battle over joint custody has played out over three decades. Responding 
to early lobbying efforts by fathers’ groups,50 California enacted a statute in 1980 that some read 
to create a preference for joint custody.51 Women’s groups, described as “strangely silent” during 
the debate over this law, began to mobilize in the mid-1980s52 and lobbied successfully for 1988 
statutory revisions clarifying that California law included no presumption for joint custody.53  
Since that time, the best interest standard has remained the custody decision rule in California, 
despite major campaigns by fathers’ rights groups promoting shared parenting.  In 2005, for 
                                                 
47NOW actively lobbied against a proposed bill creating a joint custody presumption in New York in 2009. Marcia 
Pappas, NOW- New York State Oppose Memo, Mandatory Joint Custody at  
http://www.nownys.org/leg_memos_2009/oppose_a3181.html.  Earlier Mike McCormick and Glenn Sacks credited 
NOW with blocking shared parenting legislation in New York and Michigan. . NOW at 40: Group’s Opposition to 
Shared Parenting Contradicts Its Goal of Gender Equality, July 27, 2006 at Fathersandfamilies.org. Business and 
Professional Women\USA also lobbied actively against the 2005 California bill. See infra note _. 
48A coalition of domestic violence groups, the California Alliance against Domestic Violence, played a key role in 
the 2005 California battle over joint custody legislation.  See also AB 1307, Bill Analysis, Assembly Comm. on 
Judiciary, May 3, 2005, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1301-
1350/ab_1307_cfa_20050502_142229_asm_comm, last visited 4\8\10 (hereinafter Bill Analysis). See also Irene 
Weiser & Marcia Pappas, Fathers’ Responsibilities Before Fathers’ Rights, July 29, 2006 at 
nownys.org/fathers_resp.html, visited June 15, 2012 (NOW leaders argue mandatory joint custody threatens 
domestic violence victims).  
49In California, the Family Law Section of the State Bar and the Judicial Council opposed the 2005 joint custody 
bill. See Bill Analysis, id.    
50
 See note _ supra. 
51The statute lists joint custody first in the order of preferences (“to both parents jointly or to either parent”) that 
guides judges among available custody options. It also includes a presumption favoring joint custody when the 
parties agree.  CAL.FAM. CODE  §3040(A)(1980) (THOMSON WEST 2007). 
52
 Hugh McIsaac, Who Get’s the Children? Clarifying Joint Custody, L.A.TIMES, Dec 18, 1988, Pt 5, p 3 
(describing history of joint custody in California and 1988 statute).  NOW took an active role in lobbying against 
joint custody laws by the mid-1980s. Id. 
53
 Id. CAL. FAM CODE  §3040 (B). The 1988 (and current) statute expressly provides: “This section establishes 
neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but 
allows the court and the family the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the 
child.” One legislator expressed regret that fathers groups were disappointed, but said, “we want what is best for 
kids, not the daddies.”   See Bill Analysis, supra note 48.  
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example, a bill creating a presumption favoring equally shared physical custody was sponsored 
by a broad coalition of fathers’ rights organizations.54 The bill was opposed by women’s 
organizations,55 domestic violence groups, the Family Law Section of the State Bar, and 
organizations of judges-- and it ultimately failed.56  
 In general, the effort to promote joint custody legislation has fallen far short of the goals 
of the fathers’ rights movement. To be sure, there have been some successes. Joint legal custody 
is favored under some statutes and has become the norm in many states. Statutes in California 
and a few other states create a presumption favoring joint custody if parents agree to the 
arrangement, while other states direct courts to explain the decision not to order joint custody 
when proposed by a parent.57 And many legislatures have enacted policy statements endorsing 
substantial contact with both parents, often at the urging of fathers’ groups.58 These reforms, no 
doubt, have influenced some courts to be more receptive to joint custody and perhaps to fathers’ 
claims generally.59 But the most important goal of fathers’ advocates is a statutory presumption 
                                                 
54Testifying in favor of the bill at the hearings were representatives of the Children’s Rights Council (active in the 
1988 legislative battle), the Family Rights Network, Men Enabling New Solutions, Live Beat Dads, and the 
Coalition of Family Support. See Testimony, Assembly Judiciary Comm. on A.B. 1307, May 3, 2005 available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi- (hereinafter Testimony). See also Bill Analysis, id. 
55See Bill Analysis, id. Women’s groups included California NOW, the Cal. Alliance against Domestic Violence, 
the Feminist Majority, California Women’s Law Center, the national and state Business and Professional Women’s 
Organization, and the Commission on the Status of Women. Id. 
56Bill Analysis, id.. The Judiciary Committee ultimately declined to vote out the bill for full Assembly 
consideration. Id.  
57
 See note 51 supra; IOWA CODE ANN.  § 598.41 (1)(A) (WEST 2001)( court must explain in writing why joint 
physical custody was not ordered when requested by a party). But see In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 
696 (Iowa 2007) (provision does not create a presumption favoring joint custody).   
A few statutes appear to favor joint legal custody. MINN. STAT.  §518.17 (West 2009)(rebuttable 
presumption favoring joint legal custody when a parent requests). See also ORE REV. STAT.  §107.105(1) (directing 
that joint custody be encouraged “when appropriate”). Margaret Brinig found this change to have a modest impact 
on custody orders. She concludes that the statute functions as a penalty default which parties bargain around. 
Margaret Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 779 (2005-06).   
58See note _ infra (discussing these policies and friendly parent provisions). A substantial majority of state statutes 
include these provisions. See ABA CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY STATE, supra note 75.  
59
 But see Brinig, note 57 supra (study finding many couples opt out of joint custody; also finding increase in 
domestic violence claims). 
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directing that fathers and mothers have equal time with their children, and this prize has eluded 
them in almost all states.60 In response to the intense political battle between mothers’ and 
fathers’ advocates, legislatures have retained the  best interest standard and declined to enact a 
custody rule favoring joint physical custody.    
B. The Politics of Motherhood  
  This account of the political battles over joint custody sheds some light on the durability 
of the best interest standard, but it also raises further questions. Women’s advocates have played 
a key role in resisting joint custody reforms, but why have they done so little to promote the 
legislative enactment of a rule more favorable to mothers? Feminist scholars have emphasized 
the deficiencies of the best interest standard and argued that mothers are disadvantaged in 
custody adjudications under contemporary law.61 Many feminists strongly favor a preference 
favoring the primary caretaker, which is also endorsed women’s organizations.62 But promoting 
this reform has not been a priority for mothers’ advocates;63 instead their efforts to influence 
custody law have been directed toward resisting joint custody initiatives, promoting strong 
                                                 
60
  Only three states have statutory presumptions favoring shared physical parenting. See FLA. STAT. ANN.  §61.13 
(THOMSON WEST 2006); LA. STAT. ANN.  § 9:335 (THOMSON WEST 2006); N.M. STATS. ANN.  § 40-4-9.1. (REPL. 
VOL. 153.131)(not requiring equal time).  But fathers’ advocates claim many more. See Testimony, supra note 55 
(statement by sponsor of 2005 California law, Rep. Dymally, rejecting that the bill was a radical reform, suggesting 
that 11 states had similar laws). This exaggeration may represent an effort to persuade legislatures that joint custody 
represents an emerging trend. Some ambiguity is created by statutes that do not distinguish clearly between legal 
and physical custody. Idaho, Iowa and Texas, often described as states with joint custody presumptions, favor joint 
legal custody but not equal residential time. SEE IDAHO CODE ANN.  §32-717B (THOMSON WEST 2009); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN SECT.153.131 (WEST 2008);  IOWA CODE ANN.  §598.41 (1)(A) (WEST 2001).     
61See generally,. Karen Czapanskiy, Draftees and Volunteers: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV.1415 (1991); Nancy Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing? 7 WMS. RIGHTS L. REP.(1982); Martha Fineman, 
Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031 (2001).  
62See NOW\NYS Mission Statement, infra note 63. 
63
 The NOW-NYS web site includes a mission statement that it supports legislation requiring that custody be 
awarded to the primary caregiver. This statement is not on the main web page (appearing under “other family 
issues”) and is not elaborated. http://www.nownys.org/domesticrel.html, visited on 10\5\12.  NOW has devoted far 
more energy to fighting joint custody initiatives and promoting domestic violence presumptions. Women’s groups 
undertook a modest unsuccessful effort to enact the preference in California in 1988 as part of battle over joint 
custody. See McIsaac, supra note 53.  
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domestic violence presumptions and permissive relocation rules, and seeking to discredit and 
exclude parental alienation as a relevant factor.64  
 The reasons for this seeming disinterest in reforming the best interest standard likely are 
complex. Women’s organizations such as NOW may view the primary caretaker preference as a 
“hard sell” politically because, given contemporary family roles, it clearly favors mothers, 
despite its formal gender neutrality.65 In contrast, fathers’ interest groups can promote a joint 
physical custody presumption as grounded in gender equality. But it is also likely that advocates 
for mothers simply are not as dissatisfied with the best interest standard as are fathers and their 
supporters.  To be clear, mothers groups protest the failure of courts deciding custody disputes to 
recognize domestic violence claims and judges’ willingness to consider (what advocates view as 
bogus) alienation evidence.66  But, mothers’ supporters simply do not express the kind of 
pervasive bitterness about custody outcomes under the best standard that has energized fathers 
and fueled the joint custody movement. Indeed, in the political battle over joint custody, 
mothers’ advocates have aligned with judges and attorney groups in defending the discretionary 
best interest standard.67 Mothers groups in Minnesota did not oppose 1989 legislation abolishing 
                                                 
64
 NOW, along with regional groups such as the California Alliance against Domestic Violence have actively 
lobbied against joint custody bills. See note _ supra. Domestic violence groups have also challenged the judicial 
emphasis on parental alienation as harmful to victims. See Irene Weiser, The Truth about Parental Alienation (2007) 
at  http://www.stopfamilyviolence.org/get-informed/custody-abuse/parental-alienation-syndrome/the-truth-about-
parental-alienation, last visited Oct 11, 2012. California women’s groups supported bills aimed at limiting the 
admissibility of PAS evidence. See Http://www.cafcusa.org/child_custody_evaluations.aspx  (fathers’ group 
describing and criticizing the campaign to limit admissibility of PAS).   
65In Minnesota, a key argument in favor of legislative abolition of primary caretaker preference was that the 
preference was unfair to fathers. See Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond te Best Interests of the Child, 75 Minn. L. 
Rev 427 (1990) at n. 227.  
66
  See e.g., Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial 
Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J GENDER SOC. POLICY & L. 657 (2003)(analyzing why domestic 
violence is discounted by courts deciding custody.) See note _ supra (describing opposition to PAS evidence).  
67In opposing joint custody legislation, mothers’ organizations have advocated for retaining the discretionary 
standard. See Bill Analysis, supra note 48; Testimony, supra note 55.    
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a judicially created primary caretaker preference and reinstating the best interest standard.68 
Further, a state-wide survey of family law attorneys found strong support for the view that judges 
tend to favor mothers in custody proceedings (and little support for the view that they favor 
fathers).69  This evidence is far from conclusive, but it does suggest that mothers in general fare 
relatively well in custody proceedings and their advocates in the political arena do not see the 
need for dramatic reform of the best interest standard.  
The intense focus on domestic violence may also have diverted attention from other 
matters that are perceived to be less urgent than the need to protect women and their children in 
custody disputes. Mothers’ groups link virtually all custody initiatives to domestic violence, 
including the opposition to joint custody and to friendly parent provisions.70  Indeed, many active 
opponents of joint custody are groups primarily concerned with domestic violence, rather than 
with broader women’s issues.71 Thus, perhaps it is not surprising that the gender war over 
custody law is sometimes characterized by politicians as a battle between men’s groups and 
domestic violence advocates.72  
 C. Legislative Response to Gender Politics  
 The thirty-year gender war over custody has resulted in a political economy deadlock that 
likely has contributed to the entrenchment of the best interest standard. Legislatures have 
                                                 
68
 See Crippen, supra note 65 at n. 227. 
69TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS , GENDER FAIRNESS 2002 AT 49-50, OREGON S.CT. & STATE BAR, reporting 
Gender Equity Survey of Lawyers (domestic relations lawyers surveyed find more judicial bias v. fathers (70% 
agree) than mothers (5% agree) in custody proceedings).  See also TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS, W.VA. S.CT. 
OF APP. (1996) (finding that mothers are awarded custody under primary caretaker statute when care is evenly 
divided).  
70
 See Amy Levin & Linda Mills, Fighting for Child Custody When Domestic Violence is an Issue, 48 SOCIAL 
WORK 463 (2003) (arguing that abusers seek joint custody to gain access to victims and that women must be free to 
oppose this arrangement). See also Weiser, supra note 64 (NOW leader links PAS and domestic violence).  
71See note 64 supra.  
72
 See Statement by Bill Howe, Hearing to Discuss SB 243 and 244. Howe emphasized that the legislature must not 
adopt the views of interest groups.  
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declined to act, in part, because each of the two more precise rules that have substantial political 
support is perceived as favoring either fathers or mothers and, therefore, is unacceptable to a 
powerful interest group that is ready to battle against enactment. This is the lesson of the struggle 
by fathers’ groups to enact joint custody legislation, and no one doubts that efforts by mothers’ 
advocates to enact a primary caretaker preference would face similarly fierce resistance. Under 
these conditions, legislatures considering the enactment of either custody rule can anticipate high 
political costs.  Interest group competition thus likely has lead to legislative inaction, an outcome 
reinforced by continuing support for the best interest standard by judges and attorneys--  
respected non-partisans in the gender war.  
 The absence of significant legislative movement to replace the best interest standard is 
compatible with observations of political scientists and legal scholars who study the political 
economy of lawmaking.  Public choice theory suggests that when the political costs of enacting a 
rule are high, legislatures sometimes may opt for a vague standard, delegating to courts the task 
of providing legal content in individual cases.73  Advocacy groups are more likely to mobilize 
when legislation clearly impacts their interests than when outcomes are uncertain. In the realm of 
custody legislation, the contrast between the smooth enactment of statutes embodying the best 
interest standard in the 1970s and 1980s and the more recent battles over joint custody is 
instructive. The former appear to have generated little political controversy.74 Who could be 
offended by the innocuous expression of a benign policy goal accompanied by a list of factors 
                                                 
73
 Public choice theory predicts that where competing interest groups advocate for and against legislation, 
legislatures will favor no bill or delegate regulation to agencies or courts, rather than incurring the wrath of one of 
the opposing groups. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, PHILLIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION 58-60 (4TH ED. 2007).  
74
 The 1989 adoption of the Minnesota best interest standard, promoted by fathers groups, was uniformly supported 
by the Minnesota state Bar Association and faced little opposition by women’s groups. See Crippen, supra note 65 
at 227.    
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for judicial consideration?  In contrast, the struggles over joint custody suggest the difficulties in 
accomplishing collective legislative action on contested issues. In the face of organized 
opposition, lawmakers may be inclined to punt, enacting or retaining a vague standard and 
delegating hard decisions to courts. 
 
IV. DEFINING BEST INTERESTS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
PARENTAL ALIENATION 
The gender war over custody has also played out in battles between mothers’ and fathers’ 
advocates over the content of the best interest standard itself—with greater success on both sides.  
Mothers’ advocates have effectively promoted statutory provisions categorically disfavoring the 
parent who has violently threatened either his child or the other parent.75  In response, fathers 
groups have sought to weaken these laws while urging lawmakers (also successfully) to 
emphasize parental alienation as a key factor in the custody decision.76 Both domestic violence 
and alienation implicate core policies of modern custody law. The importance of prohibiting an 
abusive or violent parent from obtaining custody is self-evident, but parental alienation is also 
linked to a key policy goal—the promotion of both parents’ continued involvement with the 
child after divorce.77 In recent years, domestic violence claims by mothers and alienation claims 
by fathers have dominated custody adjudications,78 often trumping other evidence offered by the 
                                                 
75
 More than half of the states have rebuttable presumptions explicitly disfavoring the abuser for custody; others 
include domestic violence as a factor in custody.  See state-by-state ANALYSIS OF CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE BY STATE, A.B.A COMM. ON DOM. VIOLENCE (2008) at http://www.abanet.org/domviol (hereinafter ABA 
CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE) .   
76
 See discussion t.a.n _ to _ infra.  
77
 See discussion t.a.n _ to _ infra. 
78See Peter Jaffe, Claire Crooks & Samantha Poisson, Common Misconceptions In Addressing Domestic Violence in 
Custody Disputes, 54 JUV & FAM CT J. 57, AT 58-59 (2003)(citing studies showing 75% of cases involve domestic 
violence claims)(hereinafter Common Misconceptions). See James Bow, Jonathon Gould & Flens, Examining 
Parental Alienation in Child Custody Cases: A Survey of Mental Health and Legal Professionals, 37 AM. J. FAM. 
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parties. 
On first inspection, these reforms seem like positive developments that could mitigate the 
deficiencies of the best interest standard by bringing determinacy to important categories of 
cases in which particular bad behavior presumptively should disqualify a parent from custody.79 
But as the discussion that follows will show, domestic violence and (particularly) parental 
alienation claims themselves are very difficult for courts to evaluate. Because of this uncertainty,  
and because these factors are weighed so heavily in custody decisions, parents may be motivated 
to bring marginal claims that may be hard to distinguish from legitimate allegations.  
 A. The Domestic Violence Presumption 
 Over the past generation, legislatures in most states have enacted laws emphasizing that 
acts of family violence warrant special attention in custody decisions. Physical abuse of a child 
has long been a key consideration in deciding custody, but until recently, violence toward a 
spouse or partner was not presumed to be of particular importance to the child’s welfare.80 This 
changed as advocates argued persuasively that exposure to violence in the home harms children, 
whether they are targeted or not.81 Today most custody statutes direct that a parent who has 
                                                                                                                                                             
THERAPY (2009)(estimating that 30% of cases involve PA claims).   
79
 In other legal settings governed by vague standards, doctrine often evolves over time in ways that increase 
determinacy in case outcomes. Sometimes courts create rules, establishing precedents generally or in particular 
kinds of cases. See Ian Ayres, CITE at 1415-16; Holmes, CITE.  Legislatures also can promulgate rules aimed at 
subcategories of cases.  For example, the violation of statutory safety standards is presumed to constitute negligence, 
trumping the indeterminate reasonable care standard. See Kenneth Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 53 
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1187, 1200-02 (2001). 
 Custody law also has incorporated several rules that presumptively outweigh other factors in the 
application of the best interest standard.  For example, all states exclude from custody a parent shown to be unfit 
and, in some jurisdictions, the custodial preference of an older child is presumed to be dispositive.  Scott, Reppucci 
and Aber CITE. 
80A judge in the custody dispute between O.J. Simpson and his deceased wife’s parents excluded evidence that he 
killed his wife. See Ellman et. al., CITE at 560.   
81Domestic violence became an important political issue in the 1980s and 1990s, and advocates have been the 
driving force in lobbying for domestic violence presumptions, with important support of law enforcement interests.  
See generally JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING 
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engaged in acts or threats of violence against either a child or the other parent is presumed to be 
unsuitable for custody.82 These laws create a rule within the broader best interest standard aimed 
at a presumably small subset of cases involving violent parents. 83   
 A domestic violence presumption would seem to represent a sound and uncontroversial 
proxy for best interests. Few would object to the idea that a parent who acts violently toward his 
child or partner is unsuitable to be his child’s custodian, or that evidence of serious domestic 
violence should trump other considerations in the custody decision. Moreover, a domestic 
violence presumption avoids the evidentiary problems created by incommensurable and complex 
emotional and psychological factors when it can be established through concrete factual evidence 
of the alleged behavior.  
But often this is not possible; indeed evidence of domestic violence may be even less 
accessible to outsiders than other private family behavior. Perpetrators of child sexual abuse 
invariably act secretly, and children may be unable to provide credible accounts of the behavior. 
Adult victims also may be reluctant to disclose acts of violence even to relatives and friends 
when the family is intact. Thus, unless the perpetrator has inflicted severe injury requiring 
medical attention, or the victim, other family members or neighbors have reported incidents to 
law enforcement authorities, the behavior may be known only within the family. In many cases, 
the parent’s report will be the primary source of evidence supporting a domestic violence claim 
in a custody dispute and the court’s decision about whether to apply the presumption will be 
                                                                                                                                                             
PRIVACY (2009)(describing growing importance of domestic violence). Support was generated by studies indicating 
that perpetrators of spousal or partner abuse are at risk for committing child abuse as well. Robert Strauss, 
Supervised Visitation and Family Violence, 29 FAM. L. Q. 229, 237-38 (1995).  Studies also showed psychological 
harm to children from exposure to violence between parents.  Honore Hughes, Impact of Spousal Abuse on Children 
of Battered Women, 2(12) VIOLENCE UPDATE (1992). For a general review, see GEORGE HOLDEN, GEFFNER & 
ERNEST JOURILES (EDS.) CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE (1998) .   
82
 See e.g. UTAH CODE §30-3-10.2 (“history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse or kidnapping”); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(9) (“family abuse”)   
83See 2008 compilation in A.B.A. CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY STATE, supra note 75..  
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based on a judgment about the claimant’s credibility and that of the parent denying the charge.84  
Courts typically rely on psychological evaluations in making this determination, but as we 
explain below, these evaluations are also based largely on parents’ accounts and are of 
questionable reliability.85 As a consequence, courts seeking to accurately assess these claims may 
often face a daunting challenge.  
   The extent to which parents bring insubstantial domestic violence claims is 
unclear. Not surprisingly, fathers groups argue that a high percentage of allegations are false,86 
while mothers’ advocates insist that marginal claims are rare.87  The truth probably lies 
somewhere between these poles.88 False claims likely are unusual, but more common may be 
allegations based on suspicions (in the case of child abuse) or exaggeration of the seriousness of 
                                                 
84A few statutes require corroborated evidence or an elevated standard of proof. See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT.  §25-
403.3; IDAHO 32.717 (“habitual perpetrator.”)  See e.g. IOWA CODE §598.41 (1); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§125.480(4)(K)(clear and convincing evidence); MICH. COMP. LAWS   §722.21 (SAME). But most statutes have no 
such restrictions.  See e.g. CAL. FAM. CODE   §3044 (preponderance of evidence); MISS. CODE   §93-5-24; DEL. CODE 
TIT. 13   §13.705A (no standard); COLO. REV. STAT.  §14-10-124 (“credible evidence”) TEX. FAM. CODE   §153.004 
(same). 
85See t.a.n _ to _ infra. See James N. Bow & Paul Boxer, Assessing Allegations of Domestic Violence in Custody 
Evaluations, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1394 (2003)(describing MHP’s reliance on victims’ reports) ; Jaffe, et 
al, supra note 78;  Johnston, Allegations of Sexual Abuse l., CITE . 
86See e.g. RICHARD A. GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS AND MENTAL HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS (1986) (father of PAS argues that most sexual abuse claims in custody proceedings are false); 
Stephen Baskerville, Family Violence in America: The Truth about Domestic Violence and Child Abuse 36 (2006) 
(American Coalition for Fathers and Children memorandum arguing allegations of domestic violence in custody are 
either false or isolated incidents that are the product of divorce conflict); An Epidemic of Civil Rights Abuses: 
Ranking of States Domestic Violence Laws, RADAR Services, Inc (2008) at www.radarsvcs.org. (finding that most 
domestic violence claims in divorce involve families with no history; allegations of abuse are “part of 
gamesmanship of divorce.”).   
87See Developments in the Law: Battered Women and Child Custody Decisionmaking, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 
1619 (1993)(arguing false allegations of domestic violence are unlikely because violent behavior produces evidence 
and children are often witnesses).  See also Lisa Bolitan, When Parents Fight: Alaska’s Presumption against 
Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA LAW REV. 263, 293 (2008)(reporting evidence 
indicating that mothers seldom make false domestic violence claims in custody disputes). The real problem, 
according to mothers’ groups, is that judges don’t believe mothers’ allegations. See 
http://www.batteredmotherscustodyconference.org. 
88The most careful study found that about 50% of abuse claims were substantiated in some way (police records, 
witnesses, medical reports, or expert testimony). See Johnston, et. al, Allegations and Substantiations of Abuse, 
supra note 85. But see t.a.n. _ to _ infra (describing problems with expert testimony).  See also Thea Brown, Fathers 
and Child Abuse Allegations in the Context of Parental Separation and Divorce, 41 FAM CT REV. 367 (2003) 
(substantiation rate for claims against fathers of about 50%).  
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violent incidents due to distorted recollections. Thus an angry mother may erroneously interpret 
her child’s behavior and comments as providing evidence of abuse by the father,89 or an atypical 
act of aggression may be remembered as part of a pattern of intimidation.90 Researchers report 
that some individuals with no history of violence strike out at their spouses in the midst of 
marital breakdown.91 These isolated incidents are seen as categorically different from the 
violence perpetrated in battering relationships,92 but perceptions and memories in the context of 
divorce can be unreliable. Domestic violence allegations are pervasive in this setting.93 Some 
advocates argue almost all custody disputes involve a violent parent, which seems unlikely.94 
The evidence is scanty but it suggests that parents sometimes bring marginal claims.95   
                                                 
89Research evidence indicates that child sexual abuse claims are substantiated less frequently than partner violence. 
See Johnston, et. al, Allegations and Substantiations of Abuse, supra note 85 at 290. Studies find between 23% and 
42%. See Jaffe et. al., supra note 78 at 506. 
90
 For a description of how a spouse’s behavior and negative traits become exaggerated in the midst of divorce, see 
Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Ungerwager, Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce and Custody Disputes, 9 BEHAV. 
SCIENCES &  L. 451 (1991). 
91
 The category of separation-linked violence involves isolated uncharacteristic acts of violence by either spouse 
“reacting to stress of separation or divorce in a relationship that has not otherwise been characterized by violence or 
coercive control.” Jaffe et. al., supra note 78. at 501. All types of domestic violence increases at the time of divorce. 
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY: REPORT OF THE APA PRESIDENTIAL TASK 
FORCE ON VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY (1996).  
92
 Id. The goal of protecting victims in battering relationships involving an ongoing pattern of intimidation and 
injury has driven the legislative adoption of domestic violence presumptions. Researchers identify several distinct 
categories of domestic violence, one involving violence in battering relationships, and two involving separation-
linked violence.  See Peter Jaffe, Janet Johnston, Claire Crooks, and Nicholas Bala, Custody Disputes Involving 
Allegations of Domestic Violence: Toward a Differentiated Approach to Parenting Plans, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 500, 
500-01 (2008) (describing several categories and citing studies finding these categories); N. Ver Steegh, 
Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence: Implications for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379 (2005); Johnson, 
Apples and Oranges in Child Custody Disputes: Intimate Terrorism vs. Situational Couple Violence, 2(4) J. CHILD 
CUSTODY 43 (2005).  
93
 See Bow and Boxer, supra note 85 at 1396 (allegations in 72-80% of cases); Jaffe et. Al, supra note 78 (75%); 
Garland Waller, Biased Family Court System Hurts Mothers, at 
http://www.womensnews.org/article.cfm?aid=641&mode=articlesent. (70% of contested cases); Irene Weiser, 
NOW\NYS, supra note 96 (80%). 
94
 See Family Violence Intervention Steering Comm. for Multnomah County (1997) (letter to Oregon Task Force on 
Family Law (arguing for presumption that all adjudicated custody cases involve violence).     
95A survey of domestic relations attorneys representing both men and women found that a majority thought that 
marginal claims of domestic violence were sometimes raised in custody cases. Gender Equity Survey of Lawyers, 
supra note _.  The problem may be greater when fathers seek joint custody opposed by the mother. Margaret Brinig 
found that domestic violence claims by mothers increased significantly in response to Oregon legislation favorable 
to joint custody.  Brinig argues that mothers claimed domestic violence to avoid application of a new law. See 
 24 
 It is easy to see how this might happen. Under the best interest standard, the outcome of 
custody adjudication is uncertain and a presumption that trumps other factors provides a 
powerful advantage. An attorney representing a mother appropriately will probe whether her 
client or the client’s child has been a victim of family violence, and will present any credible 
evidence that might persuade the court to apply the presumption to the case. 96  Under these 
conditions, it would be surprising if marginal claims were not advanced.97 
 Two kinds of harm (beyond mundane administrative costs) may be incurred if parents 
offer marginal domestic violence claims. First, courts may wrongly apply the presumption, to the 
detriment of good fathers and their children. A finding of domestic violence can influence the 
outcome beyond the determination of which parent is awarded custody; it also often results in 
restrictions on a parent’s access to the child.98 This is appropriate when serious violence is 
accurately verified, but not if the finding is erroneous. 
 A second cost is more speculative, but also potentially troubling: Courts confronted with 
frequent claims of family violence in custody disputes (including some that appear to be 
marginal or even spurious) may come to adopt a skeptical stance, rejecting not only false 
allegations but legitimate claims as well.  If so, the insistence by mothers’ advocates that judges 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brinig, supra note 57 at 804, 810.  Even sympathetic observers acknowledge that the salience of domestic violence 
to custody may encourage false or marginal claims. See Jaffe et. al., supra note 78 at 508. See also William Austin, 
Assessing Credibility in Allegations of Marital Violence in High-Conflict Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCIL. 
CTS. REV. 462 (2000) (suggesting that claiming domestic violence creates strategic advantage and expressing 
concern over false claims).    
96If claims were readily verifiable, marginal claims would be deterred. For example, if a presumption favored the 
taller or shorter parent, strategic use would be difficult (but it would be a bad best interests proxy).  
97A 1990s study (conducted at a time when domestic violence claims were likely less common than today) indicated 
that judges tended to favor the parent alleging spousal abuse, even if the claim was not substantiated. See Bow & 
Boxer, supra note 85 at 1397.   
98Under many statutes,  parents found to have perpetrated domestic violence are restricted to supervised visitation or 
excluded from contact with their children altogether See IND. CODE   §1-17-2-8.3; GA. CODE   §19-9-3; WASH. REV. 
CODE   §26.09.191(2).  
 25 
tend to be unsympathetic to these claims might be accurate.99  Experience with claims of child 
sexual abuse in the 1990s suggests that courts may become somewhat skeptical in response to 
ubiquitous allegations supported by weak evidence.100  
A presumption that a violent parent should not be awarded custody is a rule supported by 
important policy interests that potentially can resolve an important category of disputes, without 
requiring difficult comparisons with other evidence. However, the ability of courts to verify 
domestic violence claims is uncertain because the information is often private; this asymmetry 
encourage marginal claims that, under current legal formulations,101 threaten to undermine the 
utility of the presumption.   
 B. Parental Alienation as a Response. 
 As family violence emerged as a key factor in custody adjudication in the 1980s, 
advocates for fathers responded by promoting the importance of parental alienation, often 
claiming that domestic violence allegations were part of a pattern of alienation. These efforts 
have been effective, partly due to proponents’ success in linking parental alienation to custody 
law’s strongly articulated policy of encouraging both parents’ continued involvement in their 
                                                 
99
 See Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on 
Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L. Q. 247 (1993)( describing bias against domestic violence claimants in family 
law cases); 94 AMER J. PUBLIC HEALTH 951, 953 (2004); M. Pagelow, Justice for Victims of  Spouse Abuse in 
Divorce and Child Custody Cases, 8 VIOLENCE VICTIMS 69 (1993). See also Child Custody and Visitation Decisions 
in Domestic Violence Cases at rightsformothers.com. (Courts don’t believe mothers claiming domestic violence). 
100
 The evidence is suggestive. In the 1980s and 1990s, many custody disputes involved sexual abuse allegations, 
often supported by testimony by MHPs. See Alan Klein, Forensic Issues in Sexual Abuse Allegations in 
Custody/Visitation Litigation, 18 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 247 (1994). This psychological evidence was challenged 
by fathers’ advocates, See RICHARD GARDNER, supra note 86 (most sexual abuse claims in custody disputes are 
false), but also by neutral observers. See Robert Levy, Using Scientific Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 
FAM. L. Q. 383 (1989); Johnston, et al., Allegations of Abuse, supra note 85  (describing low rate of substantiated 
child sexual abuse claims).  Today these allegations are raised less frequently, while claims of partner violence have 
increased dramatically. Survey on file with the authors. Fathers’ advocacy groups currently also focus far more on 
false allegations of domestic violence than on child sexual abuse. See www.fathersandfamilies.org (DV listed as 
issue category #7 & sexual abuse as #24); www.acfc.org (Online magazine Liberator focusing heavily on DV).   
101
 In Part V, infra, we propose reforms that may improve judges’ ability to evaluate domestic violence claims.  
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children’s lives after family dissolution.102  This policy goal has been advanced through statutory 
“friendly parent” provisions directing courts to encourage cooperation by considering the extent 
to which each parent supports the other’s relationship with the child.103 Although lawmakers 
viewed these measures as creating positive incentives for parents,104 their primary impact has 
been to elevate the importance of parental alienation as an extreme form of non-cooperation.  
 In contrast to domestic violence, no formal legal presumption disfavors the hostile parent, 
or provides a trump to the parent demonstrating alienation. Nonetheless, over the past generation 
courts have assigned great importance to this custody factor.105  This is due partly to the efforts 
of fathers’ advocates, but also of MHPs urging the importance of alienation through expert 
testimony in custody proceedings.  Indeed its prominence is due in part to the relentless efforts of 
psychologist Richard Gardner, who in the 1980s identified “parental alienation syndrome” (PAS) 
based on his observation of divorcing fathers wrongly (on his view) accused by hostile mothers 
of abusing their children.106  Many experts follow Gardner in framing the alienating parent’s 
conduct as a mental disorder, but even those who do not endorse the “syndrome” diagnosis view 
alienation as a critically important issue in evaluating best interests.107 Thus, a parent whose 
child is withdrawn or hostile toward him has reason to expect that expert testimony on alienation 
                                                 
102
 Other reforms promoting this goal include the requirement of parenting plans and the expanded parental  
authority of non-custodial parents. For discussion, see Elizabeth Scott, Parental Autonomy, 11 WM. & MARY BILL 
OF RTS. J. 1071, 1081 & N. 9 (2003).   
103CAL FAM. CODE  §3040 (court shall consider “..which parent is more likely to allow the child...frequent and 
continuing contact with the non-custodial parent”). At least 32 states have a friendly parent provision in some 
version. See ABA CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY STATE, supra note 75. 
104Bill Howe, Chair of an Oregon family law task force, argued that a friendly parent provision would create 
beneficial incentives for paents. “You score points by explaining how you will encourage the relationship with the 
other parent.” Supra note 72. 
105
 See ELLMAN ET. AL., supra note _ at 663-64; Scott, Parental Autonomy, supra note 102. Alienation claims are 
also important in relocation cases. See Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P3d 81 (Cal. 2004).  
106
  Richard Gardner’s comprehensive treatment of PAS and argument of its relevance to custody disputes is offered 
in THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME (2ND ED. 1998). See discussion, t.a.n. _ to _ infra (discussing lack of 
scientific basis for PAS.) 
107See studies discussed infra note_ finding alienation to be among the 2 or 3 most important custody factors. 
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will count heavily in his favor. As with domestic violence, the importance assigned to this factor 
encourages marginal claims. As only the most acrimonious parents typically adjudicate custody, 
alienation claims are ubiquitous.108 
 Like domestic violence allegations, charges of alienation rest on private family 
information that may be difficult for a court to verify; indeed, courts may be unable to even 
assess the source of a child’s hostility toward a parent. But parental alienation claims are also 
problematic for another reason. Currently, we simply lack the scientific knowledge to determine 
whether anger directed toward a parent in the context of divorce is entrenched or a transitory or 
to evaluate the benefit (or cost) of awarding custody to the estranged parent. 109 Even though it is 
grounded in the legitimate goal of promoting both parents’ future involvement in their child’s 
life, alienation has no scientific basis as a best interest factor.   
 An alienation claim may appear to have particular salience when the other parent alleges 
domestic violence. In fact, many custody disputes play out as gender battles in which courts are 
presented with competing claims of domestic violence and parental alienation.  Often, one kind 
of evidence is introduced to counter and nullify the other.110 Thus, a father may introduce 
evidence of parental alienation to persuade the court that the mother’s allegation of violence is 
                                                 
108
 Studies have found about 35% of adjudicated cases involve alienation claims. See Bow et al., supra note 78. 
109
 For a comprehensive analysis of the deficiencies of PAS, see Carol Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome and 
Alienated Children- Getting it Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 FAM. L. Q. 527 (2001). 
110
 PAS was conceived in part to provide a defensive weapon for fathers in custody battles involving domestic 
violence claims. See notes _ supra. A survey of family lawyers and MHPs involved in custody assessments found 
reports of  35% of cases involving both alienation and domestic violence claims and 29% involved both child abuse 
and alienation. Bow, et. al., supra note 78. Many reported opinions involve both claims. See e.g. Schumaker v. 
Schumaker, 931 So 2d. 271 (Fla. App. 2006)(mother claims domestic violence; father in response claims alienation); 
V.U. v. L.U., A2d 2006, WL 2707346, N.J. Super, 2006); Smith v. Smith, WL 21774003 (Conn. Super 2003); 
Breitenfeldt v. Nickels-Breitenfeldt, WL 1908070 (Minn. App. 2003); In re Marriage of J.H. & Y.A., Cal Rep. 3rd 
2009, WL 2106145; See Renaud v. Renaud, 721 A2d 463 (Vt. 1998). See also discussion and sources cited in Janet 
Johnston, Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and Refuse Visitation: Recent Research and Social Policy 
Implications, 38 FAM. L. Q. 757 (2005)(hereinafter Children of Divorce).    
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not merely false, but pathological.111  In turn, a mother who is targeted with alienation charges 
can explain her hostile attitude as grounded in genuine fear of the father’s abusive conduct.112 
Sometimes these claims are valid- and most likely are honest. But the importance of these 
(already) key factors under contemporary custody law has been amplified, and their strategic use 
possibly increased, because of they have been enlisted as competing weapons in the ground war 
between mothers and fathers over custody.  
* 
In theory, the emergence of domestic violence and parental alienation as key custody 
factors would seem to represent progress toward a more satisfactory legal framework for 
resolving these disputes. The success of advocates for mothers and fathers in establishing the 
importance of these issues may have allayed their concerns about the vagueness and uncertainty 
of the best interest standard. Moreover the factors themselves embody important policy 
objectives and potentially might guide courts in resolving two important categories of cases.  
These developments may have diminished frustration with the application of the best interest 
standard and contributed to its durability.  
For the benefits of greater determinacy to be realized, however, judges must be able to 
accurately adjudicate domestic violence and alienation allegations and, as we have shown, this is 
often extremely difficult. Nonetheless, judges frequently consider these claims, apparently 
without complaining that the assignment exceeds their capacities. In the next section, we suggest 
that judges turn to MHPs to assist them in assessing domestic violence and alienation allegations 
and, more generally, to evaluate best interest factors and advise them on custody decisions.  
                                                 
111See RICHARD GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME, supra note 106. 
112
 Domestic violence advocates argue that parental alienation claims are used to discount children’s legitimate fears 
in violent family situations. See The Truth about Parental Alienation 2\23\2007 at stopfamilyviolence.org.   
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IV. MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND THE ILLUSION OF 
SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE  
 The political economy deadlock provides only a partial explanation for the entrenchment 
of the best interest standard. Also important is the apparent satisfaction with the custody standard 
of judges and attorneys; both groups have opposed joint custody laws, arguing that courts must 
be afforded broad discretion to consider the circumstances of each custody dispute.113 To an 
extent, judges may simply enjoy the broad discretionary authority afforded by a vague standard 
(and it may create greater demand for attorneys’ services). But courts’ routine practice of 
consulting with psychologists and other MHPs114  to assist them in applying the best interest 
standard,115 has obscured the rule’s deficiencies and likely dampened frustration with its 
application. Although they are unlikely to speak in these terms, judges seem to believe that these 
experts have the skill to obtain private family information and assess its credibility and the 
knowledge to evaluate and compare best interest factors. Thus, in most custody proceedings, 
MHPs play a critical role as neutral experts whose opinions are sought by courts and whose 
recommendations often determine custody arrangements, either as the basis of the court order or 
as the impetus for parents’ agreement.116  
                                                 
113
 In the 2005 legislative battle over joint custody in California, a representative of the Family Law Section of the 
State Bar opposed the “cookie cutter” approach of a joint custody presumption and articulated the standard rationale 
for retaining a vague standard to resolve custody decisions. “Judicial discretion is necessary in custody matters 
because …families are different. This difference requires different custody orders tailored to fit the specific family 
and the needs of the children.” See Testimony, Molinaro, supra note 55.  
114Our criticism applies with equal force to psychologists and other MHPs (mostly psychiatrists and clinical social 
workers) who serve as experts in custody disputes. Only psychologists administer and interpret (what we view as 
inappropriate) psychological tests. See t.a.n. _ infra.     
115
 See  Daniel Shuman, The Role of Mental Health Experts in Custody Decisions: Science, Psychological Tests and 
Clinical Judgment, 36  FAM. L.Q. 135,157-158 (2002)(discussing the growing use of court appointed experts in 
custody cases). 
116See t.a.n. _ to_ infra.  
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 This delegation of judicial function to mental health experts is deeply problematic. These 
professionals may be better positioned than judges to acquire private family information and they 
can sometimes assist courts by offering observations about family functioning or parental 
pathology.  But MHPs are not expert at assessing credibility and have very little scientific 
knowledge to guide them in linking clinical observations or test data to qualitative best interest 
proxies or in weighing or comparing incommensurable factors in making custody 
recommendations to the court. A part of the problem is that rules that restrict the admissibility of 
scientific evidence generally in legal proceedings often are not applied to custody proceedings, 
and judges tend to be uncritical in assessing the quality of the opinions of court-appointed 
experts. Were the standard evidentiary screen applied, most psychological evidence that 
currently forms the basis of custody decisions (including expert testimony on domestic violence 
and alienation) would be excluded and the deficiencies of the best interest standard would be 
more obvious.  
    A. The Role of Mental Health Experts in Resolving Custody Disputes 
 The influence of MHPs in shaping custody decisions is linked to  two dimensions of their 
role that distinguish them from experts in other legal proceedings; their input is solicited by the 
court117 and they are invited to offer opinions on the ultimate legal issue.118   Of course, parents, 
like litigants in other legal proceedings, can introduce psychological testimony in support of their 
                                                 
117Courts have the authority to appoint experts under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE 706) and under some state 
statutes, but seldom exercise this authority. John Wiley, Taming Patent, 50 UCLA LAW REV 1413, 1429-31(2002).  
One reason cited is relevant to custody proceedings– concern about experts’ neutrality. Id. at 1431(quoting Richard 
Posner, “the judge cannot be confident that the expert whom he has picked is a genuine neutral.”).  
118
 In general, ultimate issue testimony by experts is problematic because it usurps the factfinder’s function. See 
JOHN CONLEY & JANE MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 110 (2007). See also Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. 
State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 (n.10) (9th Cir. 2002)(excluding ultimate issue testimony on this 
basis). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not exclude ultimate issue testimony if the evidence would otherwise be 
admissible. FRE 704.  We will argue that ultimate issue testimony in custody proceedings should be disallowed 
under this provision. 
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respective claims. But opinions of party experts may be seen as biased,119 whereas MHPs who 
perform custody evaluations as neutral experts are presumed credible and their opinions carry 
substantial weight.120  
 MHPs’ recommendations influence custody outcomes in several ways. First and most 
obviously, courts typically request that MHPs make specific recommendations regarding the 
custody arrangement that will promote the child’s best interests121 and judges usually follow the 
advice offered by court-appointed experts.122  But beyond their direct influence on courts, 
MHPs’ opinions also influence parents’ decisions to settle their disputes. Neutral evaluators’ 
reports are commonly shared with the parties prior to the custody hearing, with the purpose, in 
part, of encouraging a settlement in accord with the expert’s recommendation.123 The empirical 
evidence indicates that this strategy is effective; evaluations lead to the settlement of a 
substantial proportion of cases that otherwise appear to be destined for litigation.124  
MHPs have assumed this expansive and unusual role as experts in custody proceedings 
because courts have encouraged them to do so. In the face of daunting challenges in applying the 
                                                 
119
 Commentators argue that evaluators working for one party are so handicapped by their position that they should 
avoid the practice for both scientific and ethical reasons. See Lois Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, Psychological 
Evaluations in Divorce Custody:Problems, Principles and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY 
PROCEDURES: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES AND EXPERTISE (LOIS WEITHORN, ED. 1987) . 
120See Shuman, supra note 115 at _(arguing that psychologists’ role “is being transformed from expert as expert to 
expert as judge.”) 
121
 James Bow & Francella Quinnell, Critique of Child Custody Evaluations by the Legal Profession, 42 FAM.CT. 
REV. 115(2004). (survey finding that 84% of judges and 86% of attorneys wanted evaluators to make specific 
custody recommendations). 
122MHP recommendations are highly predictive of custody outcomes. See Shuman, supra note 115; Emery, et. al., 
Critical Assessment, supra note 15; Steven Erickson, Scott  Lilienfeld, & Michael Vitacco, A Critical Examination 
of the Suitability and Limitations of Psychological Tests in Family Court, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 157 (2007).. 
123See Shuman, id. at 159.  
124Id. at 158. See also ROBERT MNOOKIN & ELEANOR MACCOBY, DIVIDING THE CHILD, 137-140 (describing 
settlement post-evaluation). A relatively new dispute resolution process, “early neutral evaluation,” has the explicit 
goal of promoting settlement. Couples litigating custody are offered a brief, confidential and relatively inexpensive 
MHP evaluation, after which the evaluator discloses her tentative custody recommendation. See generally Jordan 
Santeramo, Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases. 42 FAM.CT. REV. 321 (2004)(reporting high settlement rate).  
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legal standard, judges enlist MHPs to guide them in evaluating the parties’ claims and to offer an 
opinion on the ultimate question of what allocation of custody between the parents will promote 
the child’s best interest. But in doing so, courts are asking more of mental health experts than 
they are capable of producing on the basis of their expertise.  
B. Analyzing the Custody Evaluation Process: The General Critique 
 A well trained MHP may play a useful but limited role in providing information to the 
court derived from a clinical family evaluation.125 Mental health experts are trained to conduct 
interviews of individuals regarding intimate matters and to observe behavior and interactions, 
some of which may be relevant to custody. They also have the opportunity to interact with 
families in a setting that is more conducive to acquiring information than is possible in a 
courtroom. Moreover, MHPs can diagnose established mental illnesses on the basis of observed 
behavior; thus, a psychologist can inform the court that a parent suffers from a serious substance 
abuse problem, depression, or schizophrenia. But even in this limited role, clinicians’ 
performance may be hampered in custody evaluations in ways that do not arise in other clinical 
settings. Much of the information on which MHPs rely comes from contesting parents who are 
motivated to create a positive impression and disclose only information useful to their claims. 
Psychological training does not provide the tools to obtain accurate and complete private 
information from parents or to assess its credibility.126 
 Moreover, many MHPs do not limit themselves to these contributions. Instead, they 
                                                 
125
 The typical custody evaluation includes clinical interviews of parents and children, observations of parent-child 
interactions, psychological testing of both parents and children, and, sometimes a review of medical and 
psychological records and contact with teachers and other professionals involved with the family. See generally 
Jonathan Gould and David Martindale, The Art and Science of Child Custody Evaluations. (2007). 
126
 MHPs may have a slight advantage over judges in this regard, but extensive research reveals only minor 
differences in the ability to detect lies based on professional training or other qualities. See generally Charles Bond, 
Jr. and Bella DePaulo, Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 132 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
BULLETIN. 477(2008) 
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engage in an extended inferential process on the basis of their objective observations to reach 
psychological conclusions about family members and their relationships with one another. Based 
on those conclusions, they may offer predictions and assessments relevant to custody and 
ultimately an opinion about the custody decision itself. This input often involves evaluations of 
qualitative factors such as the closeness of the parent-child relationship, parental competence, 
and alienation.127 But social scientists have challenged the expertise of evaluators in most 
custody cases to contribute input beyond observations and established diagnoses,128 arguing that 
psychologists violate both scientific norms and professional ethical standards when they offer 
opinions based on the typical evaluation process.129   
 This questionable inferential process is deployed in several ways to support opinions that 
rest on uncertain or illusory science. First, many MHPs use clinical observations to make 
speculative predictions and substantiate favored diagnoses or constructs that are without 
scientific foundation.130 MHPs bolster their conclusions with findings from psychological tests 
that are a core element of most custody evaluations. These tests carry an aura of scientific 
objectivity, but, as critics have demonstrated, add little to the clinical evaluation.131 Further, 
                                                 
127
 Tippins and Whitman offer an example of the formulation of psychological opinion on a parent-child relationship 
that illustrates this inferential process: The psychologist observes the child clinging to his mother’s leg and 
concludes that he fears separation from her. Based on this conclusion, the expert predicts that long separations from 
his mother will likely cause this child to experience significant distress; therefore, he should live with his mother and 
overnight visits with the father should be avoided at this time. See Tippins & Whitman, supra note 15. 
128Id. See also Emery, et. al., Critical Assessment, supra note 15; Shuman, supra note 115; Erickson, et. al., note 
122. 
129
 Tippins & Wittman note that a specific custody recommendation appears to violate Ethical Standard 9.02(b) of 
the Ethical Principles for Psychologists which states, “Psychologists use assessment instruments whose validity and 
reliability have been established for use with members of the population tested. When such validity or reliability has 
not been established psychologists describe the strengths and limitations of the test results and interpretation. Note 
15 at 205. 
130
 PAS is a good example of such an unsubstantiated diagnosis. See t.a.n. _ to _ infra. 
131Psychological tests routinely employed in custody evaluations include those that are scientifically valid but of 
very limited utility in this setting (such as the Minnesota Multi-phasic Personality Inventory) and those that have 
little or no demonstrated validity (such as the Rorschach Inkblot test). For critiques of the use of psychological tests 
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mental health evaluators routinely offer opinions about issues that are controversial without 
acknowledging the underlying scientific uncertainty.132 In general, psychological opinions are 
shaped by professional and theoretical perspectives and personal biases in ways that are seldom 
transparent.133 Finally, in offering opinions on how custodial responsibility should be divided, 
the psychologist makes a number of questionable inferential moves on the basis of her 
observations, evaluating and comparing the relative importance of particular factors to 
custody.134 Nothing in the relevant scientific knowledge or in clinical training provides the 
expertise to perform these functions. Not surprisingly, scientific critiques of custody evaluations 
uniformly conclude that MHPs should play a very circumscribed role in adjudication and 
particularly should not offer opinions on the ultimate issue of custody.135 
C. Assessing Family Violence and Parental Alienation   
As Part IV explained, many adjudicated custody disputes involve claims of parental 
alienation and\or domestic violence,136 usually supported by the testimony of mental health 
experts.  The critique of psychological evaluations in custody disputes applies with as much 
force to these issues as it does more generally.  At least today, psychological assessments of 
allegations of family violence and parental alienation raise troubling issues of scientific validity, 
                                                                                                                                                             
in custody evaluations see Erickson, et. al, supra note 122 at 166; Tippins and Wittman, note 15; Emery, et.al., id.  
See also Marc Ackerman & Melissa Ackerman, Custody Evaluation Practice: A Survey of Experienced 
Professionals, 28 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 137 (1997).  
132
 For example, MHPs disagree about whether infants and toddlers should have overnight visitation. See Emery, et. 
al., Critical Assessment, supra note 15 at _ 
133Thus the evaluator’s concern about separation anxiety in Tippins’ and Wittmann’s example in note 127 may 
derive from a Freudian view of mother-child attachment. 
134In the example, id., the evaluator may compare the importance of the child’s separation anxiety to factors that 
weigh in favor of the father– for example, his greater emotional stability.    
135See Tippins and Wittman, supra note 15;  Emery, et. al., id.; Shuman, supra note 115. 
136See t.a.n. _ to _ supra.  
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and, standing alone, offer inadequate support for these claims.137  Mental health experts have no 
greater knowledge or expertise in evaluating the credibility of these allegations than do judges, 
and in the case of parental alienation the construct itself is grounded in deeply flawed “science.”  
1. Family Violence.  
 Many domestic violence claims are decided by courts, in part because of an 
understandable view that these allegations should be adjudicated and not resolved through 
mediation or other forms of dispute resolution that may not protect victims.138 Not surprisingly, 
courts often turn to psychological experts for assistance in considering these claims, and often 
the clinician’s role is to endorse (or challenge) the alleged victim’s credibility, on which basis the 
custody outcome itself may ride.139   
The evaluation of family violence allegations is a complex business. Allegations of 
physical or sexual abuse of children often are based largely on evidence provided by the 
accusing parent, who is may already be distrusting and suspicious of the alleged abuser. Among 
the frequent claims of partner violence in custody cases,140 some allegations likely involve the 
pattern of violent acts in a battering relationship, while others may be based on acts of less 
serious situational violence-- a product of the heated context of divorce.141 The latter may not be 
predictive of future behavior, despite victims’ beliefs and concerns about their severity.142 
                                                 
137
 Domestic violence claims are often supported by police and court records, medical records, accounts of 
witnesses and physical evidence. What is problematic is expert testimony substantiating a parent’s allegation on the 
basis of the evaluator’s conclusion that her account is credible, where other evidence is absent. 
138
 See generally (special issue),“Domestic Violence”, 46 FAM. CT. REV.(2008). 
139See Austin, supra note 95; Jaffe, et. al., supra note 78 at 507-08 (discussing credibility assessment). Some argue 
that custody arrangements should differ (ranging from no contact to co-parenting) based on the potency, pattern, and 
primary perpetrator of domestic violence.  See  Jaffe et. al, id.  
140
 Supra note 133 (discussing incidence). 
141See note _ (sources discussing types of domestic violence).   
142
 A growing consensus indicates that conflict-instigated/situational violence and separation violence are the most 
common categories of domestic violence, and are often reciprocal. Kelly & Johnson, note 119.  But women are 
victims far more frequently of violent acts causing serious injury or death. See note 121 supra. 
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Ascertaining the nature and extent of violence on the basis of the alleged victim’s claim may be 
difficult or impossible absent corroborating evidence. 
Psychological experts may contribute to custody cases involving domestic violence by 
evaluating alleged victims for post-traumatic stress disorder in appropriate cases.143 Beyond this, 
MHPs have little to add to victims’ allegations. Although empirical efforts are underway to 
develop objective measures for assessing domestic violence claims,144 the research is at an early 
stage. Currently, in the absence of objective external evidence, custody evaluators must rely on 
self reports in attempting to determine whether a pattern of serious domestic violence exists.  But 
MHPs have no special skill in determining the truth in a controversy that often boils down to “he 
said, she said.”145  No scientific research supports their ability to determine the accuracy of 
allegations of violence or to distinguish among different types of violence in an individual case 
on the basis of the alleged victims’ reports. Further, critics assert that many domestic violence 
experts are biased toward believing victims,146 which, if true, makes their involvement even 
more problematic.  Inaccurate “expert” opinions either supporting or discrediting domestic 
violence claims can have devastating consequences. 
 
                                                 
143Post traumatic stress disorder is a recognized psychiatric diagnosis under DSM  IV- TR. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4TH ED., TEXT REVISION). 463-468 
(2000). 
144
 See Desmond Ellis & Noreen Stuckless , Domestic Violence, DOVE, and Divorce Mediation, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 
658 (2006),  discussing evidence on a new instrument, the Domestic Violence Evaluation (DOVE). This measure is 
empirically based and designed to assess levels of risk, but assessment is based on self-report; thus it does not avoid 
the problem of potential bias.   
145Victims’ advocates recognize that often little extrinsic evidence of violence exists, but lament that courts often do 
not accept claims on the basis of victims’ accounts. Jaffe et.al., supra note 78 at 507-08. William Austin points out 
that no methodology currently exists to assess credibility in this context and emphasizes the need to look to external 
corroborating or disconfirming evidence.  See Austin, supra note 95. 
146
 See GARDNER, note 108 supra.  Domestic violence advocates argue that evaluators not trained in domestic 
violence assessment tend to discount claims. See CLARE DALTON,  NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION 
EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A JUDGES GUIDE 1.  
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2. Parent Alienation “Syndrome.”  
 Expert opinion on parental alienation represents the most troubling misuse of 
psychological evidence in child custody proceedings. To be sure, the important policy of 
promoting cooperation between parents is supported by psychological knowledge: The research 
indicates that exposure to severe conflict between parents is harmful to children’s adjustment 
after divorce.147 But expert testimony on parental alienation typically is not based on this 
knowledge. Instead, as discussed above, parental alienation emerged as a key issue in part 
through the efforts of psychologist Richard Gardner, who “discovered” PAS and labeled it a 
psychiatric disorder.148 His work and advocacy for PAS have been highly influential with 
custody evaluators (even those who reject the syndrome diagnosis149) and indirectly with 
courts.150 According to one survey, experienced evaluators listed alienation as the second most 
important factor in child custody evaluations (following only a parent’s active alcoholism)151 
Although not all MHPs subscribe to Gardner’s claim that custody in the alienated parent is the 
prescribed “cure” for the disorder, an expert’s conclusion that a child’s hostility is based on the 
parent’s alienating behavior can be dispositive in shaping her recommendation.152 
 Despite its influence on MHPs and courts, the “diagnosis” of PAS lacks any credible 
                                                 
147
 See generally Robert Emery, Interparental Conflict and the Children of Discord and Divorce, 92 PSYCHOLOG. 
BULLETIN. 310 (1982); E. MARK CUMMINGS AND PATRICK DAVIES, MARITAL CONFLICT AND CHILDREN: AN 
EMOTIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE (2010). 
148
 But the DSM-IV, the official manual for psychiatric diagnoses, does not include PAS as a disorder or even as 
one of several “Criteria Sets and Axes Provided for Further Study” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., supra note _ at 759. 
Moreover, the proposed revision of the manual, DSM-V, does not include any official mention of or proposal for 
including PAS. See: http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx.   
149
 Bow, et. al., supra note 78 (studying of MHPs showing 36 % of custody evaluations involve alienation, but 75% 
of respondents did not view alienation as a “syndrome.”).  
150This is probably because parental cooperation in general is an important consideration. See t.a.n  141-143 supra.  
151
 Alienation was deemed more important than domestic violence, the child’s emotional relationship with each 
parent or each parent’s emotional well-being. Ackerman & Ackerman, supra note 183.   
152
 Nicholas Bala, Suzanne Hunt, and Carolyn McCarney, Parental Alienation: Canadian Court Cases 1989-2008. 
48 FAM.CT. REV. 164 AT 166(2010) (in Canadian study, judges found alienation in  82 of 135 cases between 1999 
and 2008). 
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scientific basis.153  Gardner’s studies fail to meet minimal requirements universally recognized in 
the scientific community;154the study on which he based his diagnosis used no statistical analysis 
and was not subject to independent evaluation through publication in a peer reviewed journal– a 
core requirement for legitimate scientific research.155 Further his research has never been 
replicated, another key criterion of valid research.156     
Scientists have begun to study children who are aligned with one parent and hostile to the 
other in the context of family breakdown, but this research, to date, offers little guidance to 
courts. It suggests that the causes of children’s alienation are complex. Either or neither parent 
may contribute to the estrangement-- some children may simply align with a parent in response 
to the family crisis. 157 We also cannot yet predict the impact of alienation on the child’s future 
relationship with the targeted parent. And we don’t know whether separating the child from the 
aligned parent does more harm than good. 
Parental alienation in theory may be a good proxy for best interests, but the construct is 
complex and involves qualitative assessments based on problematic predictions, interpretations 
and inferences.  Currently, we have no scientific basis for evaluating the impact on the child’s 
welfare of alienation or its importance relative to other custody factors.  
                                                 
153
 See generally Joan Kelly & Janet Johnston, The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation 
Syndrome,. 39 Fam. Ct. Rev. 249 (2001); Johnston & Joan Kelly, Rejoinder to Garner’s “Commentary on Kelly and 
Johnston’s ‘The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome.’ 42 FAM. CT. REV. 622 (2004); 
Robert Emery, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents Bear the Burden of Proof. 43 FAM.CT. REV. 8 (2005). 
154For example, his diagnosis of PAS was based almost entirely on interviews with his clients, parents who claimed 
to be the victim of alienation. See RICHARD GARDNER, supra note 106 at 41 (2001)(explaining that “the likelihood 
of my obtaining cooperation from more than a small percentage of the alienators was extremely small.”). 
155
 Gardner acknowledged the lack of statistical analysis in PAS studies. See R.A. Gardner, Commentary on Kelly 
and Johnston’s “The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of the Parental Alienation Syndrome.” 42 FAM.CT. REV. 611 
(2004).  
156No empirical studies have validated PAS. See notes 148 supra.  
157Janet Johnston in a study of high conflict custody disputes, observed that pre- adolescent (roughly 8 to 12 years 
old) children align defensively with one parent in high conflict divorces and found many sources of hostility besides 
brainwashing.  Janet Johnston, Parental Alignments and Rejection: An Empirical Study of Alienation in Children of 
Divorce, 31 J. AM ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 158 (2003).  
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D. Bad Science and the Absence of Evidentiary Standards  
The misuse of psychological science in custody proceedings is facilitated by the absence 
of the evidentiary restrictions that apply to other legal proceedings.  The admissibility of 
scientific evidence is regulated in most state and federal courts by the Daubert test,158  devised 
by the Supreme Court to exclude unreliable testimony and assure that the expert’s input is 
relevant to the facts at issue in the case. The mandate that scientific evidence be subject to a 
threshold examination for validity and reliability is guided by the intuition that expert witnesses 
rendering opinions can disproportionately influence fact finders simply by virtue of their status 
as experts.159  
 For the most part, testimony by MHPs in custody proceedings has not been subject to this 
screening; few jurisdictions require systematic scrutiny of the scientific merits of these experts’ 
opinions.160  In part, this response may be explained by the fact that most experts in custody 
proceedings are neutral and court-appointed, and the judge’s appointment probably evidences her 
confidence in the scientific merit of the expert’s opinion. 161 Further, because judges, and not 
juries, hear custody cases in most states, appellate courts may believe that judges can sort good 
from bad science as they consider expert opinions. 
  But little evidence supports this assumption.  Courts routinely consider expert testimony 
                                                 
158Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)(evidence must be grounded in reliable 
scientific methodology and reasoning and relevant to the facts of case). Daubert replaced Frye v. United States, 293 
F. 1013 (D.C. 1923) which is still applied in a few states. See CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 118 at 58 to 74. 
Daubert directs judges deciding whether scientific evidence is admissible to evaluate whether the theoretical basis of 
the opinion is testable, whether the technique or approach on which it is based has been subject to peer review, and 
whether the technique or approach is generally accepted in the general scientific community. Id at 593.   
159CONLEY & MORIARTY, id. at 40. 
160
 See note 165 infra (describing admissibility of PAS).  
161Thomas Reidy, Richard Silver, Alan Carlson, Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L. Q. 75 
(1989-90) (court appointed experts opinions weighed more heavily than party experts). . 
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on PAS, for example, despite the lack of any scientific foundation for this diagnosis.162 In 
general, scientific observers have concluded that most psychological evidence currently admitted 
in these proceedings would be excluded under Daubert-- and should not carry weight in  judges’ 
decisions.163   
As long as the best interest standard persists as the custody decision rule, judges are likely to 
urge mental health experts to offer opinions on the ultimate issue of custody unless they are 
legally restricted from doing so by the evidentiary screen that applies to other legal proceedings. 
On our view, the collaboration between judges and MHPs has contributed to the entrenchment of 
the best interest standard; the assumption that MHPs have the expertise to guide courts in 
applying the standard obscures its intractable evidentiary challenges. The problem, as we have 
seen, is that psychological experts cannot perform this assignment without exceeding the 
boundaries of their scientific expertise and their participation in custody proceedings does 
nothing to improve the accuracy of custody determinations. 
 
V. REFORMING CUSTODY DECISIONMAKING 
 Our account of the state of modern custody law and practice is somewhat gloomy: 
Current doctrine is even more problematic than Mnookin and other scholars have recognized, but 
it is reinforced by a powerful political dynamic that impedes law reform and by misplaced 
                                                 
162See e.g. White v. Kimrey, 847 So.2d 157 (La. 2003)(court accepts PAS diagnosis and gives father physical 
custody); Karen B v. Clyde M. 574 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Fam. Ct. 1991)(court accepts PAS diagnosis in concluding sexual 
abuse allegation is fabricated);  Doerman v. Doerman, 2002 Ohio 3165 (WL June 24, 2002) (upholding decision to 
retain custody in father due to mother’s severe PAS). In criminal proceedings, some courts have rejected PAS 
testimony. People v. Loomis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 787 (NY Co. Ct. 1997)(rejecting PAS testimony to show child sexual 
abuse allegation was fabricated).  
163
 See Shuman, supra note 115; Erickson et al., note 122. Tippins and Wittman note “scholarly argument 
supporting the empirical foundations for... (custody) recommendations is scant to nonexistent…”  Supra note 15 at 
211.  Part V argues that Daubert should be applied to custody proceedings and that evidence on PAS should be 
excluded. 
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confidence in the ability of mental health experts to guide courts in making custody 
determinations. Under the conditions that we have described, what steps can be taken to improve 
custody decisionmaking? 
 In this Part, we explore reforms that potentially can reduce error and other costs of 
resolving custody disputes and that have some prospect of adoption by lawmakers. Most 
ambitiously, we propose that the best interest standard be refined and narrowed through the 
adoption of the ALI approximation standard, a sound and relatively verifiable proxy for best 
interest for which accurate evidence can be obtained.164 Approximation allocates custody on the 
basis of past caretaking in most cases, and thus largely obviates the need for psychological 
testimony. It also represents a compromise between the alternative rules favored by mothers and 
fathers that both interest groups ultimately may be persuaded to accept.  Moreover, other 
stakeholders who currently support the best interest standard may favor this alternative rule if 
they comprehend that MHPs lack the expertise to guide judges in making custody decisions.   
But even under the current legal standard, evidentiary and procedural reforms can be 
implemented to improve custody decisionmaking.  First, reforms that promote accuracy in 
adjudication are desirable. Lawmakers should restrict the role of psychological experts by 
applying to custody proceedings the standards that govern the admissibility of scientific evidence 
in other legal proceedings. Second, reforms that aim to avoid adjudication altogether, such as 
collaborative divorce165 and mediation, have gained traction in many states as lawmakers 
recognize that, in most cases, parents are in a better position than judges to plan for their 
                                                 
164ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4; Scott, Pluralism and Child Custody, id.  
165
 In collaborative divorce, both parties and their attorneys agree that, if the parties cannot reach agreement, the 
attorneys will not represent them in adjudicating the dispute. See gen. Penelope Bryan, Collaborative Divorce' 
Meaningful Reform or Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POL. & L. 1001( 1999).  
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children’s future custody.166  
A. The Case for Approximation 
 The approximation standard allocates future custody proportionately between the parents 
on the basis of their caretaking roles while the family was intact. 167 Unlike the primary caretaker 
preference, approximation does not frame the custody decision as a zero sum game in which one 
parent wins and the other loses. In most cases, the parents continue to share decisionmaking 
authority and each parents’ allocation of physical custody is determined on the basis of the 
family’s past practices. Current research indicates that fathers perform about one third of child 
care;168 thus, a typical custody order would allocate time between the parents on this basis. If the 
parents have shared caretaking responsibility equally before dissolution, their custody 
arrangement will be much like joint physical custody.   
 Although no rule will direct the optimal outcome in every case, approximation mirrors 
the underlying policy goals of custody law at least as well as do any of the psychological and 
emotional factors that currently serve as proxies for best interest.  Basing custody on past 
parental care promotes continuity and stability in the child’s environment and relationships, 
preserving caretaking arrangements with which both the child and the parents are familiar.169  
Approximation is grounded in developmental knowledge that confirms the importance of the 
                                                 
166See Singer, supra note 18 (describing trend). Some states mandate mediation for most couples who petition for a 
hearing. See CAL. FAM. CODE SECT. 3170 ET. SEQ (WEST 2008)(directing mediation in most cases upon petition for 
custody hearing).  
167See Scott, Pluralism and Child Custody, supra note 4 (proposing approximation standard). In 2000, the ALI 
adopted a custody standard based on approximation. See PRINCIPLES SECT. 2.08, Id. 
168See Bianchi, supra note _. A division of custodial time in which one parent gets 120 days or more of custodial 
time per year constitutes joint custody in many states for child support purposes.  See VA. CODE ANN SECT. 20-
108.2 (MICHIE 2009). 
169Many joint custody families drift toward an arrangement in which the child lives predominately with the mother. 
See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 124 at 162-70.  This may suggest that parents (and children) are more 
comfortable with their pre-dissolution roles than with the preferences they expressed at the time of divorce. Scott, 
Pluralism, supra note 4 at 635 (making this argument). 
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bond between the child and the caretaking parent,170 but also in recent research confirming the 
critical role of fathers as secondary parents.171 
Moreover, approximation creates a proxy that is easier to verify than the qualitative factors 
that are prominent under the best interest standard and it functions as a substitute for key factors 
that are otherwise non-verifiable.  Relevant evidence focuses on concrete behavior that 
establishes the family’s caretaking practices and routines; thus, qualitative evidence is 
inadmissible except in those cases where one parent is alleged to be unfit to care for the child.172 
To be sure, caretaking evidence may also depend on private family information. But courts can 
more accurately evaluate objective and quantitative evidence of caretaking than the qualitative 
factors that dominate under current law.173  Furthermore, past caretaking itself provides the best 
available indicator of hard-to-measure factors such as the bond between parents and child or 
parental competence.  
The exclusion in most cases of qualitative behavioral evidence will have salutary effects 
beyond promoting accuracy and reducing the verifiability problems faced by courts today.  First, 
restricting the range of evidence should discourage litigation and simplify proceedings, thereby 
reducing adjudication costs.  It should also reduce the inclination of spouses to focus on each 
other’s deficiencies -- the dimension of custody adjudications that has the most costly 
repercussions.  Finally, in most cases, there should be little need for psychologists in custody 
                                                 
170Attachment theory emphasizes the bond between the child and the caretaking parent; it has been invoked in 
support of the primary caretaker preference. For the classic treatment, see generally, JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA 
FREUD, AND ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)(APPLYING ATTACHMENT THEORY 
IN SUPPORT OF PRIMARY CARETAKER PREFERENCE).    
171See discussion and citations of studies in Scott, Pluralism, supra note 4 at 51-52.  
172
 Unfitness has always been a basis for excluding a parent from custody. Proof of serous domestic violence 
constitutes unfitness under presumptions in most states. See note _ supra.     
173Courts should be able to discern roughly the extent to which parents share caretaking responsibilities. If one 
parent does not work outside the home, a presumption that she is a primary caretaker is reasonable. If both parents 
work full time, teachers, physicians, co-workers and babysitters can corroborate or undermine the assumption that 
the parents have shared caretaking responsibilities.  
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proceedings, and those who do participate will be more motivated to offer observations within 
the scope of their expertise. 
How will evidence of domestic violence and parental alienation be dealt with under the 
approximation standard?  Evidence of serious domestic violence can fairly be treated as evidence 
that a parent is unfit for custody; it should continue to operate as a trump in determining custody. 
We will suggest some reforms that may assist courts to accurately evaluate domestic violence 
claims.  Evidence of alienation, in contrast, should be excluded: we simply lack adequate 
knowledge to evaluate alienation claims and to weigh the importance of alienation in a 
framework that focuses on caretaking roles. 
Notwithstanding the merits of the approximation approach, the political economy deadlock 
described in Part III may impede its implementation. But since approximation represents a 
compromise between the rules favored by advocates for mothers and fathers, neither is likely to 
mobilize against this reform with the intensity directed against gender-based reform proposals. 
Moreover, if fathers continue to assume a more active role in child care, a norm of equal sharing 
of custodial responsibility may emerge. Even today, typical custody arrangements under an 
approximation standard would be closer to shared custody than to the traditional custody and 
visitation.174 Approximation is less vulnerable to allegations of unfairness by either mothers or 
fathers than alternative rules, including the best interest standard.175  Approximation offers no 
windfall for a minimally involved parent,176 but it also does not relegate either to parent second-
                                                 
174
 Recent studies indicate that fathers currently provide about one third of child care in married families, so 
approximation would result in greater custodial sharing than traditional arrangements. Suzanne Bianchi, Maternal 
Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change or Surprising Continuity? 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401, 411 
(2000).  See generally, Robert Emery, Rule or Rorschach? Approximating Children’s Best Interests, 1 CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES, 1 (2007). 
175See note _ to _ supra, describing evidence that best interest standard tends to favor mothers.  
176Some mothers’ advocates hold this view of joint custody. This response seems less likely if parents have shared 
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class “visitor” status.   
 Mothers’ and fathers’ groups have dominated political reform efforts related to custody 
doctrine, but neither is likely to take the lead in promoting the approximation standard. Other 
stakeholders, including advocates for children, family law attorneys and judges, can play this 
role however. Attorneys’ and judges’ groups have joined with mothers’ groups to defeat joint 
custody legislation, defending the discretionary best interest standard. But these groups and 
others who elevate the interests of children over those of either mothers or fathers may well be 
enlisted in support of the approximation standard if they appreciate the peculiar deficiencies of 
the best interest standard.  Family court judges care about making custody decisions that promote 
children’s welfare, and currently they believe that they can apply the best interest standard with 
the assistance of MHPs.  If judges understand that their confidence in psychological expertise is 
misplaced, they may support reform.  Moreover, some evidence suggests that legislators would 
welcome an environment in which custody reform efforts were driven less by gender politics 
than has been the case over the past generation.177 The adoption of the approximation standard 
by the American Law Institute gives it credibility as a custody rule that has been studied and 
endorsed by a respected organization of attorneys, judges and academics.178 Approximation may 
appeal to a new coalition of advocates who heretofore have played a subsidiary role and to 
legislators seeking to reduce the emotional costs of resolving child custody disputes.  
B. Improving Accuracy in Custody Proceedings  
 Even if the best interest standard remains the legal rule, there are several procedural 
reforms that can improve the ability of courts to obtain accurate information regarding family 
                                                                                                                                                             
caretaking responsibility equally when the family was intact.  Scott, Pluralism, supra note 4 at 625. 
177Statement of Bill Howe, supra note 72.  
178
 See note 4 supra. The Principles, including the approximation standard, were approved by the Council of the 
American Law Institute and adopted in 2000.  
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functioning. First, psychological experts whose input is solicited in custody proceedings should 
be restricted to testimony based on evidence that has a solid scientific basis. Second, enhanced 
standards of proof can deter marginal domestic violence claims and thereby increase the 
likelihood that legitimate claims will be recognized.  
 In most legal proceedings, scientific evidence offered by experts is admissible only after 
it is screened for reliability and relevance.179  As we have discussed, no such restrictions limit the 
admissibility of psychological evidence in custody proceedings.180 Opinions based on bad 
science can be excluded if psychological testimony in custody proceedings is subject to the same 
screening that aims to exclude deficient or irrelevant expert testimony in legal trials generally.181  
 The potential benefits of this reform apply most clearly to evidence offered by neutral 
evaluators appointed by courts. When parties seek to introduce psychological evidence, both 
opposing counsel and the court are typically alert to deficiencies and biases in the expert’s 
opinion. But the expertise of a court-appointed psychologist is often unquestioned and her 
opinion thus carries authoritative weight. As we have shown, however, there is little support for 
the assumption that an expert’s “neutrality” means that her opinion will be unbiased and based 
on scientifically reliable methods and procedures. Without a formal opportunity to challenge the 
court-appointed expert’s opinion before it is offered in evidence, the party disfavored by the 
                                                 
179See t.a.n._ to _ supra. See also CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 118 at 29-74 (discussing admissiblility 
standards); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 30-43(4TH ED. 1998). 
180
 See note _ supra (PAS testimony admitted in custody proceedings but rejected in criminal and tort proceedings). 
The response to “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” is similar. Courts typically exclude this evidence in 
criminal sexual abuse cases, when introduced in support of the credibility of the claim. See Mindombe v. United 
States, 795 A2d 35 (D.C. App. 2002); State v. Moran 728 P 2d 251 (Wyo. 1988)(evidence that child’s behavior is 
consistent with sexual abuse excluded). Evidence of the syndrome (or that the child showed behaviors of sexually 
abused child) has been admitted in custody proceedings. See, e.g,. In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3rd 1098 (1984); 
La Favour v. Koch, 124 A.D.2d 903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1986)(expert testimony that child’s allegation was 
“worthy of belief” admitted in custody proceeding); Tracy V. V. Donald W., 220 A.D.2d 888 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. 
Div. 1995) (custody decision based on expert testimony that child’s behavior (including overeating) corroborated 
allegation of sexual abuse admissible).  
181
 See t.a.n. _ to _ supra. 
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opinion is often seriously disadvantaged. Applying the conventional scrutiny to this evidence  
can reduce undue deference to the opinions of these experts. 
 This reform would represent a substantial change in judicial practice, severely limiting 
the role of MHPs in custody proceedings.  Expert opinions about the optimal custody 
arrangement would be excluded, along with unscientific diagnoses such as PAS. Beyond this, 
MHPs would be discouraged from offering pure credibility assessments, unsubstantiated 
predictions, or qualitative assessments on the basis of unsupported inferences. Testimony based 
on direct observations (and limited interpretation of this data) and established diagnoses might be 
admissible, but courts would have to undertake the demanding calculus required by the best 
interest standard without the assistance of psychological experts. This challenge might expose 
that the predominant legal standard is unworkable.   
How would this evidentiary reform affect the application of the domestic violence 
presumption?  On our view, the presumption should be retained; a parent who engages in serious 
acts of family violence should not have custody of his children. But, because the stakes are so 
high when a parent alleges domestic violence, the presumption should be applied only when the 
claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the other parent has engaged in acts of 
violence of a nature that denying custody (and restricting visitation in appropriate cases) is 
justified. In most cases, this would require that the allegation be supported by substantial 
corroborating evidence.182 This evidence could include medical or police reports from recent or 
past incidents or the testimony of witnesses.  But courts would not permit clinical testimony by 
MHPs that the claimant is credible. These professionals are simply not qualified to perform this 
                                                 
182Some state statutes require corroborating evidence. Supra notes _ & _ and in many cases, corroborating evidence 
(other than MHP testimony) is available. 182Johnston, et. al., Allegations and Substantiation of Abuse, supra note _.   
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task. The elevated standard of proof may exclude some legitimate claims of family violence, but 
the permissive evidentiary standard that prevails under current law encourages marginal claims 
that ultimately may lead to judicial skepticism about family violence claims in general.  
 C. Avoiding Adjudication- Collaborative Divorce and Mediation 
 Even if the approximation standard and the proposed evidentiary reforms are adopted, 
litigating custody will always be a costly undertaking. Outcomes are subject to error, and 
adjudication is expensive and likely to generate hostility between the parents, undermining their 
ability to cooperate in raising their child.  Thus, most families will benefit if parents avoid 
adjudication altogether by making decisions about custody themselves. Two promising 
approaches may assist parents in achieving this goal. Collaborative divorce involves a 
precommitment compact by parties and their attorneys to reach a settlement agreement. For 
parents who cannot resolve their disputes through negotiation, mediation offers a process that 
facilitates agreement to the lasting benefit of both parents and children. 
Collaborative divorce strategies were devised to encourage parties to reach agreement about 
custody and other divorce matters by increasing the cost of adjudication ex ante.183  Parties and 
their attorneys execute a contract in which attorneys agree that they will not represent their 
clients if negotiations fail and the dispute moves to litigation. This commitment to negotiating 
with the goal of reaching agreement is likely to reduce threats, bluffs and other strategic behavior 
that can cause negotiations to break down. Further, the anticipated financial and psychological 
cost to the parties of finding new attorneys to represent them in litigation deters uncooperative 
behavior in negotiations.  
                                                 
183Bryan, supra note 165.  Many articles about collaborative divorce have appeared in bar journals. See e.g. Mary 
Gallagher, Collaborative Divorce, 164 N.J. L.J. 1 (APRIL 16, 2001); Patricia Gearity, ADR and Collaborative 
Lawyering in Family Law, 35 MD. BAR J. 2 (2002); Shiela Gutterman, Collaborative Family Law, 30 COLO. LAWYER 
57 (2001). 
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In custody mediation, parents make decisions about their child’s future custody while the 
mediator controls the process, pressing them to separate hostile feelings for each other from their 
mutual concern for their child.184  Although this form of dispute resolution may not be 
appropriate in some families, research studies indicate that resolving custody disputes through 
mediation is associated generally with better post-divorce outcomes for parents and children. 
A major longitudinal study by Robert Emery and his colleagues supports this conclusion. 185  In 
both randomized trials as well as evaluations of large scale programs, mediation, as compared to 
attorney negotiations and formal adjudication, was shown to: (1) result in a larger percentage of 
cases settled out of court; 186 (2) substantially increase party satisfaction with the process of 
dispute resolution;187 and most importantly, (3) lead to improved relationships between 
nonresidential parents and children, as well as between the separated or divorced parents 
themselves.188  The researchers found that non-residential parents who mediated maintained 
                                                 
184Mediators can challenge parties’ strategic behavior and encourage them to find areas of overlapping interest that 
may suggest solutions to their dispute. See generally, EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 
28 at 147. 
185
 These researchers studied 71 mostly low income families in which the parents had failed to reach agreement 
about custody. The families were randomly assigned to mediation or litigation groups and followed periodically, 
including a 12 year follow-up. Robert E. Emery and Melissa Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: An 
Experimental Evaluation of the Experience of Parents. 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 179 (1987); 
Robert E. Emery, Sheila Matthews, & Melissa Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Further Evidence on 
the Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 410(1991) ; Robert E. 
Emery, Sheila Matthews, & Katherine Kitzmann, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Parents’ Satisfaction 
and Functioning a Year After Settlement 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1994); Robert E. Emery, Lisa 
Billings, Mary Waldron, David Sbarra, & Peter Dillon, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Custody, Contact, 
and Co-Parenting 12 Years After Initial Dispute Resolution  69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 323 
(2001). 
186
 See Emery, Matthews, and Wyer, id. at 412 (showing that 11%  cases randomly assigned to mediation v. 72% of 
adversary resolution group appeared in front of a judge).   
187
 Emery and his colleagues found that, on average, parents reported greater satisfaction with mediation than  
adversary resolution on items assessing both the presumed strengths of mediation (e.g., “your feelings were 
understood”) and the presumed strengths of litigation (e.g., “your rights were protected”).  Fathers reported more 
satisfaction with mediation, perhaps because mothers usually won in court and therefore generally were quite 
satisfied with litigation. Id. at 415. 
188
 For a summary of the studies by Emery and his colleagues, supra note 243, together with findings from other 
major research studies, see Robert E. Emery, David Sbarra, & Tara Grover, Divorce Mediation: Research and 
Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 22 (2005). 
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closer contact with their children and saw them more often than those who litigated.189  Inter-
parental conflict was significantly lower in the mediation group. Moreover, twelve years after 
divorce, residential parents in the mediation group reported more cooperation, communication 
and involvement on the part of non-residential parents.190  This study supports the potential of 
mediation to bring about improved family relationships even many years after separation and 
divorce.  
 To be sure, mediation is not a panacea. The quality of mediators varies and some court-
based mediation programs reportedly coerce parents to reach agreement, which may 
disadvantage one party where there is a power imbalance in the relationship.191 Moreover, more 
research is needed to support the positive findings of studies by Emery and others.  Nonetheless, 
existing evidence strongly suggests that less adversarial approaches to dispute resolution 
promote cooperation and involvement of both parents after divorce, factors strongly correlated 
with child and family well-being. 
* 
 Many observers have noted the irony that the best interest of the child standard seems 
                                                 
189
 See Emery, Billings, Waldron, Sbarra, and Dillon, supra note 187 at 326 (30% of non-residential parents who 
mediated saw their children once a week or more 12 years after the initial dispute compared to 9% of parents in 
litigation group).  Of non-residential parents who mediated, 54% spoke to their children on the telephone once a 
week or more 12 years later in contrast to 13% in the litigation group. Id. 
190Id at 326 (as compared to those in litigation group, residential parents in mediation group reported that non-
residential parents were significantly more likely to discuss problems with them, had a greater influence on 
childrearing decisions, and were more involved in the children’s discipline, grooming, moral training, errands, 
holidays, significant events, school or church functions, recreational activities, and vacations).  
191Opponents have been critical of mandatory mediation generally and of any use of mediation in custody disputes  
involving domestic violence; statutes authorize courts to exclude these cases from mediation. See CAL. FAM. CODE   
§3170(B) (b).  See generally Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 
1545 (1991). In general, mandatory mediation only requires attendance at one educational session, after which 
parties are free to pursue other dispute resolution. Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: 
The Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation, 47 FAM. CT. REV.. 371, 372 (2009). 
 51 
designed instead to undermine children’s welfare in the context of family dissolution.192 Making 
progress toward a child custody regime that promotes the interests of children will not be easy, 
but the reforms outlined above will go some distance toward reducing the costs of custody 
decisionmaking and ultimately the costs of divorce itself.  The approximation standard is based 
on a relatively uncontroversial proxy for best interest and its adoption would reduce error costs 
under the best interest standard.  Moreover, even if the current law is retained, evidentiary 
reforms, particularly restriction of MHPs’ participation in custody proceedings may improve  
accuracy and clarify that experts cannot resolve the indeterminacy of the best interest standard. 
Finally, encouraging parents to resolve custody disputes through cooperative negotiation and 
mediation rather than litigation will result in better outcomes for most families.  
CONCLUSION 
  
 The entrenchment of the best interest standard over the past forty years can be understood 
as arising from two quite different but interrelated sources. First, a political economy deadlock 
resulting from a gender war between advocates for fathers and mothers has deterred movement 
toward a more determinate rule.  Second, judges are relatively satisfied with the standard in part 
because they can enlist mental health experts, who are assumed to have the expertise to guide 
custody decisionmaking. But we have demonstrated that neither mental health experts nor courts 
have the expertise to apply the best interest standard in many cases. Recognition of this 
incapacity may break the political economy deadlock and provide the necessary catalyst for 
needed reforms.  
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 See generally Robert E. Emery and Melissa Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 472 (1987). 
